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ABSTRACT 
 
 Prostitution is illegal in almost all parts of the United States.  Regardless of whether one 
considers this to be positive or negative, prostitution is still a booming business and thrives 
despite the legal ramifications of the practice.  The pervasiveness of prostitution despite its 
prohibition may lead one to question the point of the legislation if enforcement is so costly and 
ineffective.  Is prostitution illegal because it harms the well being of society as a whole and the 
prostitute in particular?  Or perhaps it is simply distasteful or worse, immoral and must be 
forbidden by the law.  This, however, leads to several questions.  Should the law be able to 
regulate the behavior of individuals in private moral matters, if so, under what conditions, and 
further, should prostitution be regulated by the government or even be considered immoral?  By 
analyzing the arguments presented by various sexual ethical theories that condemn prostitution 
as morally impermissible and exposing their flaws, this thesis then turns to consent theories that 
accept some forms of prostitution as morally acceptable in order to show that prostitution, while 
illegal in the united states, is, in certain situations, morally acceptable, and should not be 
prohibited.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Prostitution is illegal in almost all parts of the United States.  Regardless of whether one 
considers this to be positive or negative, prostitution is still a booming business and thrives 
despite the legal ramifications of the practice.  The pervasiveness of prostitution despite its 
prohibition may lead one to question the point of the legislation if enforcement is so costly and 
ineffective.  Is prostitution illegal because it harms the well being of society as a whole and the 
prostitute in particular?  Or perhaps it is simply distasteful or worse, immoral and must be 
forbidden by the law.  This, however, leads to several questions.  Should the law be able to 
regulate the behavior of individuals in private moral matters, if so, under what conditions, and 
further, should prostitution be regulated by the government or even be considered immoral?  
Chapter one will discuss prostitution in the context of morality and liberty.  This chapter 
focuses on the legal issue of prostitution and when the law or government has the right to prevent 
an agent from performing some act and when it does not.  The chapter first analyzes John Stuart 
Mill‘s argument in On Liberty as well as other influential and conservative moral principles 
before turning to the Hart/Devlin debate.  The debate, which evaluates the British Wolfenden 
Report over prostitution and homosexuality, serves as a touchstone for a variety of ethical views 
on sexual morality.  After analyzing the prostitution in regard to law and morality, it is not at all 
clear that, even if prostitution is immoral, as the report claims, that it should be illegal.   
Chapter two looks to three popular and influential moral theories which condemn 
prostitution as immoral.  The first theory, St. Thomas Aquinas‘ natural law theory, is influential 
not only in the church, but as a variation of a socio-biological account of sexual reproduction.  
This view ultimately analyzes the ‗proper‘ or ‗natural‘ function of sex to determine which sexual 
acts are acceptable or immoral.  The second theory incorporates love as an essential and 
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necessary component of sexual interaction and focuses on Roger Scruton‘s text Sexual Desire: A 
Moral Philosophy of the Erotic.  The third and final theory that is discussed in chapter two is the 
radical feminist view that all sexual acts between men and women are immoral because of the 
power differential between genders which results in an inequality between the sexes.  This theory 
ultimately argues that any act of sex between men and women is immoral because it represents a 
subjugation of women and a dominance of men over them.  Since these three theories are the 
most widespread and convincing of the moral views condemning prostitution, any analysis of the 
morality of prostitution must address their concerns.  The chapter ultimately concludes that all of 
the arguments fail to provide an adequate defense of the immorality of prostitution.  
However, while the three aforementioned popular sexual theories uphold the immorality 
of prostitution, chapter three analyses liberal theories of consent which  rely upon ideas of 
autonomy to analyze sexual relationships in such a way that an entirely different conclusion is 
drawn, namely, that prostitution, as such, is not morally impermissible.  By analyzing what 
exactly valid consent is, how it relates to sexual ethics, and prostitution specifically, the chapter 
concludes with the idea that prostitution, in certain forms, is not morally impermissible. 
When discussing the topic of prostitution, it is important to distinguish prostitution, as 
such, from several practices that are generally linked to commercial sex or are confused for a 
necessary part of what is meant by prostitution.  Oftentimes prostitution is linked with organized 
crime syndicates, pimps, madams, etc. who force women and children to become prostitutes 
against their will, as well as a means to perpetuate a drug addiction or as the sole available option 
for livelihood.  These sometimes corollaries to prostitution are not what will be defended in the 
subsequent paper because while these practices can be linked with some instances of prostitution 
and are problematic for other morally reprehensible reasons, they do not define prostitution and 
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are beyond the defense of this paper.  The definition of prostitution for the purpose of this paper 
is sexual interaction (whether sexual intercourse or other forms of sexual engagement, such as 
masturbation, etc.) between adults for compensation (whether monetary or some other exchange 
of valuables).  This definition is strictly applicable to adults engaged in prostitution and does not 
defend the sadly common practice of child prostitution.  Child prostitution, on this account, will 
always be impermissible due to the mental immaturity of those below the age of consent.       
The gender of the prostitute and client is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper.  A 
common assumption about prostitution is that women are prostitutes and men their clients.  
However, while this may represent the majority of prostitution, it is not a requirement.  Both men 
and women can be prostitutes, as well as clients, and heterosexual and homosexual sex can be 
sought in a commercial sexual interaction.  While the language of this paper may seem to focus 
on heterosexual prostitution between the female prostitute and male client, any successful theory 
should not exclude the other less statistically common types of prostitution.  The appeal of the 
theory of consent in chapter three is that it forwards an argument that should apply to any sexual 
act, whether a form of prostitution, a ‗normal‘ heterosexual or homosexual relationship, or any 
combination of sexual encounters.  The argument ultimately rests on consent, what counts as 
consent, and whether the parties involved in any sexual encounter consent to the encounter.  
Ultimately, consent is both a necessary and sufficient component of sexual morality. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
LIBERTY AND MORALITY 
 
Prostitution is a topic that sparks many ethical and legal debates.  Should prostitution be 
legalized, regulated, banned, or left alone?  The debates almost inevitably turn to a discussion of 
the ―regulation of conduct by the law.‖1  To what degree should society and the government have 
legitimate power over the conduct of an individual?  What are the rights of individuals and how 
are these rights incorporated into societal regulation of conduct?  Much philosophical ink has 
been spilt on the topic; however, when writing on social issues that reference governmental 
restrictions that should or should not be placed on an individual, John Stuart Mill‘s 1859 text, On 
Liberty, is generally considered the most important required reading for contemporary thinkers.  
Mill‘s work offers significant prescriptive insight into societal control over the individual and 
when such control is legitimate or interferes with an individual‘s rights. 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty 
 Mill begins his essay by pointing out that there is a grave distinction between what 
people say about modern western governments and the reality of such governments.  When, for 
example, in the United States, we talk about a ―government of the people, for the people, and by 
the people,‖2 this does not mean that each person has a say in the governing of the country, it is 
often the case that ―the ‗people‘ who exercise the power are not always the same people with 
those over whom it is exercised.‖  Further, when we speak of the will of the people, it is 
                                                 
1
 Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed.  Introduction to Morality and the Law (Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971) 1. 
2
 Abraham Lincoln, ―Gettysburg Address‖ Speech, November 19, 1863 in Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1953). 
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generally the will of the most numerous, and does not express the will of all.
3
  Because the 
sentiments and opinions of the majority of people in a democracy are represented more fully than 
those of the minority, care must be taken to protect individuals from mob morality and 
suppression of individuality and ideas.  Mill believes that  
there is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual 
independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as 
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as protection against political 
despotism.
4
 
 
The inherent problem with democracies is the ease with which the majority can interpose their 
views, customs, and moralities on those whose opinions dissent from their own, which, in turn, 
can interfere with the progress and evolution of humankind, claims Mill.  When a majority in a 
state allows custom and morality to rule the government, it prevents the ability to create 
discourse and debate about particular dissenting views which, such views, oftentimes lead to 
progress and change due to the structure of intellectual interaction.  This progress and change is 
important because morality and the opinions of the majority tend to be based in custom and are 
often only half truths not always based in reason, but intuition.  That custom is not based in 
reason but intuition and emotion, leads Mill to claim that this is the same as basing legal and 
governmental operations on individual preferences and opinion, which are the basest form of 
understanding.  When individuals are not protected against the tyranny of the majority, fear of 
persecution, abuse, or legal ramifications prevent expression of ideas, and this in turn leads to the 
stagnation of the state.
5
  Whether a view is right or wrong should have no bearing on the 
individual‘s ability to foment discourse on the topic.  If opinions are forwarded that are opposed 
                                                 
3
 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 
1956) I: 5; numbers refer to chapter numbers followed by paragraph numbers. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid, I: 6. 
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to the prevailing moral views, it presents an opportunity to either change the prevailing view, if 
proven wrong, or solidify the view, if proven correct.  Either way, opposition does not threaten 
society, it strengthens it.  When one enacts legislation that prevents open discourse and dissent 
from the popular view, it is essentially a claim to infallibility.  By not permitting any kind of 
criticism or difference of opinion, the state and the majority are claiming to have absolute and 
infallible truth, which is denying human error.
6
  When a state, society, or government does this, 
Mill calls it ―an assumption of infallibility‖ which ―undertak[es] to decide … for others, without 
allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side.‖7   
 However, the tendency to inhibit discourse on dissenting ideas often carries over into the 
realm of action and human behavior.  The idea that the will, opinion, or morality of the majority 
is infallible reflects the tendency to suppress any kind of behavior or action that goes against 
culture or custom.  If they do not want an individual to discuss it, they certainly do not want an 
individual to do it.   For Mill, this suppression is unwarranted and he develops a principle in his 
text that he believes can serve as a test to determine whether it is justifiable for the government 
to interfere, not with merely the beliefs or opinions of an individual but with a person‘s actions.  
Mill‘s principle states ―that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty or action of any of their number is self-protection.‖8  
In other words, to prevent harm to oneself or on behalf of others (in the case of the government) 
is the only time it is acceptable, according to Mill, for the government to interfere in the lives of 
individuals.  Each individual has the right to express his/her opinion or to perform self-regarding 
actions (actions that affect only the individual in question) without interference.  To claim that 
                                                 
6
 Ibid, II: 4-6. 
7
 Ibid, II: 11. 
8
 Ibid, I: 9. 
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one is able to force another against his/her will to do something that is ‗for his/her own good,‘ 
whether physical or moral, is simply not a legitimate claim.  If the actions of an individual do in 
fact harm another, then others (i.e. the state) should and sometimes are ―absolutely require[d]‖ to 
interfere.
9
  This principle, often referred to in literature as the ‗harm principle,‘ requires others to 
allow individuals to decide for him/herself without interference as long as no other is harmed or 
their rights infringed.   
Mill asserts that in any case in which an individual does not affect the lives of others by 
his/her action, then ―there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand 
the consequences.‖10  Even in the case that the individual is in error, it is better for society, 
according to Mill, that he/she be left alone to act in whatever manner he/she sees fit.  Those in 
society who are concerned for the moral well-being of the individual may offer advice or plead 
for a change, others who condemn the acts of the individual may choose to separate themselves 
from the individual, however, it is not the case that others are permitted to ―make his life 
uncomfortable‖ or actively seek to control the actions of the individual.11  If on the other hand, 
harm is likely to be caused to others, then it is acceptable for the individual to be prevented from 
performing the act.   
 Mill, nevertheless, admits that many may still disagree that the aspect of an individual‘s 
life that both affect and do not affect others are indeed distinct.  Critics may claim that there can 
be no actions that harm, affect, or involve only a single individual.  The critic may claim that ―it 
is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself without 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, III: 1. 
10
 Ibid, IV: 3. 
11
 Ibid, IV: 7. 
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mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them.‖12  Any action 
performed by an individual, on this account, affects many others in various manners.  For 
example, it could be the case that agent A decides to visit a prostitute.  His visit to the prostitute 
affects not only himself and the prostitute (a willing, consenting, adult participant), but also 
perhaps his brother, child, friend, sister, mother, neighbor, etc.
13
  in many cases, it is not direct 
harm of others but indirect harm that critics describe.  Indirect harm caused to ―near 
connections,‖ such as embarrassment, failure of a role model to behave accordingly, disgrace of 
a family, or even offense, are not enough to prevent a self-regarding action because it is not the 
case that the ‗harm‘ caused in these cases is sufficient enough to infringe on an individual‘s 
liberty.  To do so would have negative repercussions for liberty and individual freedom.  Mill 
replies that while the action of an individual may affect others through sentiment or interest, hurt 
feelings are not a sufficient reason to allow the individual to be forcibly or compulsorily 
subjected to the law.   
If, on the other hand, through this self-regarding action, agent A inflicts direct harm on 
others, such as passing on aids to offspring or other sexual partners, use of funds that would 
prevent the care of dependants, physical harm to others, or the breaking of a vow, then his 
behavior may be subject to the law.  For example, if agent A spends his child support money on 
visiting the prostitute, and is thus, unable to take care of his child, it may be the case that his 
behavior should be censured and he should be held liable.  Or in the case of adultery or some 
other act that directly harms another, he should be censured.  However, in this case, Mill stresses 
that it is not the act of visiting the prostitute that is reprehensible, but the failure to fulfill his 
parental or spousal duties is the problem with the act.  So, again, it is not exactly clear that even 
                                                 
12
 Ibid, IV: 8. 
13
 Ibid, IV: 9.   
9 
 
in cases of direct harm to others due to an individual‘s acts that the act itself is morally 
unacceptable because it is often corollary behavior that makes the act wrong, not the act itself.
14
  
When a society condemns certain acts, such as prostitution, then, it is often not based on the self-
regarding action, but some other act that may be prohibited by law or morality.     
Thus, Mill argues that many acts that are typically reviled are self-regarding actions that 
in themselves are not wrong, and the law or the state has no justification for prohibiting them 
simply because they flout custom or have the potential in some cases to lead to harmful acts.  
The tendency of the majority to cast a suspicious moral eye on those who express their 
individuality through dissent of custom or conventionality is generally due to the conformist 
inclination of the unthinking majority.  According to Mill,  
the general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also 
moderate in inclinations; they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline 
them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who 
have, and they class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are 
accustomed to look down upon.
15
  
 
Thus, when one holds unorthodox views or acts on those views, it makes the majority 
uncomfortable, which causes a desire to purge the unease from their lives.  Many arguments for 
the legislation of popular morality stem from this unease.   
So, according to Mill, the argument that prostitution should be regulated for the moral 
well-being of the prostitutes or their clients is not a legitimate claim as it stands.  Yet, if, 
according to Mill‘s principle, the argument can be made that prostitution causes direct harm to 
others, then perhaps an argument could be made that prostitution should be legislated.   Until 
then, however, it is not clear that one can compel others to cease such a vocation.  Mill, in fact, 
makes the claim that ―over himself [or herself], over his [or her] own body and mind, the 
                                                 
14
 Ibid, IV: 10. 
15
 Ibid, III: 15. 
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individual is sovereign.‖16  Further, the collective society has no right to control ―that portion of 
a person‘s life and conduct which affects only himself or, if it also affects others, only with their 
free, voluntary and undeceived consent and participation,‖ which seems to support the view that 
one cannot legislate prostitution.
17
  It is important to note that when Mill refers to others‘ ―free, 
voluntary and undeceived consent and participation,‖ he is referring not to children, or those with 
mental defects, but those with ―mental maturity‖ who are ―past the age of being taken care of by 
others.‖18  Prostitution among consenting adults does not appear to interfere with the liberty of 
others.   
 Nevertheless, it is important to briefly consider the concept of consent in this context, as 
many critics of Mill tend to do (thought it will be discussed in greater length as the subject of 
chapter three).  Mill claims that an adult can voluntarily offer undeceived consent to another 
without either of the participants being censured by law.  The two individuals are freely engaging 
in the activity without force.  However, can consent be allowed as a means to allow another to 
engage in a morally reprehensible act?  If consent is allowed unreservedly, many claim that the 
legal system would be abused and ignored.  For example, if a person consents to become a slave, 
be beaten with a hammer, to be killed, or in some other manner to things that are typically 
disallowed in the legal system, consent in these cases are often seen as not enough to justify the 
harmful acts inflicted on the other.  However, there is a distinction between consent to physical 
harm and consent to perceived moral harm.  In reference to sexual activities, the assertion of 
harm is difficult, if not impossible to prove.  Even in the cases where physical abuse occurs in 
conjunction with a sexual act, it is not the sexual act that is necessarily wrong, but the violence 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, I: 9. 
17
 Ibid, I: 12. 
18
 Ibid, I: 10. 
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and physical harm.  In other words, it would not be impermissible because it is sex, but because 
there is physical harm.  The examples of physical harm involve actual provable harm, whereas 
the harm of being morally offended, of being psychologically affected, or of performing a 
perceived immoral act is almost impossible to prove.
19
  Because of this, consent in performing a 
sex act, for example, is not analogous to consent to being killed.  There is a lack of evidence of 
social harm in certain acts, such as prostitution, that represent a divergence from physical 
harms.
20
  The primary difference, however, between an act such as prostitution and killing, or 
even stealing, is that prostitution is an offense against moral sensibilities, whereas killing or 
property theft are offenses against a person‘s physical well-being.  Nevertheless, this concept of 
harm will be explored in greater detail below in an attempt to clarify the distinction between 
prostitution and other acts in which harm is used as an indication of permissibility.   
Harm and Offense Principles 
The various ways in which moral sensibilities affect and alter society are analyzed by 
Joel Feinberg in his text Social Philosophy.
21
  Feinberg argues, as this essay previously 
addressed, that Mill advocates and accepts what is referred to as the ‗private harm principle,‘ 
which, simply stated, is the permission of ―society to restrict the liberty of some persons in order 
to prevent harm to others.‖22  This seems to be the only occasion in which the state is allowed to 
coerce an individual against his/her will, according to Mill, and seems to be widely accepted by 
most people as a permissible case of coercion by the state.  However, Feinberg argues that Mill 
must also hold some form of the ‗public harm principle‘ because if not, he would have accepted 
                                                 
19
 A.R. Louch, ―Sins and Crimes,‖ in Morality and the Law. Ed. Richard Wasserstrom. 
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971) 73-6.  
20
 This concept will be explored in greater detail in chapter 3.   
21
 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 
1973). 
22
 Ibid, 25. 
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certain acts such as ―tax evasion, smuggling, and contempt of court.‖23  To Feinberg, acceptance 
of these acts by Mill is unlikely, and thus, Mill must, on his assumption, accept the public harm 
principle which ―justif[ies] coercion on the distinct ground that it is necessary to prevent 
impairment of institutional  practices and regulatory systems that are in the public interest.‖24  
Accepting this assumption by Feinberg for the sake of argument, he goes on to claim that while 
the private and public harm principles seem to be acceptable, it is not at all clear to what degree 
they actually are acceptable because the meaning of ‗harm‘ must first be analyzed in order to 
uncover the various uses of it and related words, such as hurt and offense.   
Harm, most typically, when discussed in legal terms relates to an interest a person has; 
however, ‗interest‘ is often a vague term at best.  Interest can be based on a desire a person has or 
on something this person does not desire, but is in ‗his/her best interest‘ or well-being.  
Therefore, when referring to a person‘s interest being harmed, Feinberg turns to legal writing to 
clarify its meaning.  He claims that there are various classifications of interest that depict 
differing degrees of harm, nevertheless,  
A humanly inflicted harm is conceived as the violation of one of a person‘s 
interests, an injury to something in which he has a genuine stake. … An interest is 
something a person always possesses in some condition, something that can grow 
and flourish or diminish and decay, but which can rarely be totally lost.
25
            
 
This idea of interest allows an analysis of those things that should or should not be regulated by 
the law.  When an individual‘s interests have been compromised, this person has been harmed.   
A distinction, however, must be made between harm and hurt because oftentimes, they 
are used interchangeably and it is not at all clear that they should.  For example, when one hears 
the statement ―A was harmed by X,‖ often this is interpreted as ―X hurt A‖ or ―A was hurt by 
                                                 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid, 26. 
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X.‖  The example that Feinberg uses to distinguish between the two is the popular phrase, ―What 
a person doesn‘t know can‘t hurt him.‖  He then looks to the sentence with the word harm 
replacing hurt.  He claims that while it is the case that if a person does not know something there 
is no way for that person to be hurt, it is not the case that if a person does not have the 
knowledge of being harmed that the harm has not occurred.  In other words, part of being hurt 
requires the knowledge of being hurt, whether physical or emotional (both of which are types of 
hurt).  So, the example that Feinberg uses of the ―cuckolded husband‖ requires the husband to 
have knowledge of the infidelity of his wife for him to be hurt emotionally.  Without the 
knowledge there is no hurt.  However, it is not the case that the husband must know that his wife 
cheated to be harmed.  This is because his interests are harmed whether he knows this or not. A 
clearer example of the relationship between harm and knowledge is Feinberg‘s example of the 
rich robbery victim.  Even in the case that the victim has no idea of or does not discover the 
robbery for some time, he is still harmed by it because his interests are compromised.  The thief 
cannot use ―He will never miss it‖ as an acceptable defense, it is a species of harm whether the 
robbed man knows it or not.  However, one thing that links harm and hurt is that anytime one is 
hurt, they are also harmed because when one is hurt, his interests are also compromised, and he 
is thus harmed.  This means that hurt is a type of harm, though not all harms are hurts.
26
 
Having shown the difference between hurt and harm, the question remains whether it is 
acceptable to coerce individuals in cases where they induce emotional distress ―when the distress 
is not likely to be followed by hurt or harm of any other kind.‖27  According to Feinberg, certain 
emotional distresses, such as ―hurt feelings‖ are not sufficient grounds for coercion because 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, 27. 
27
 Ibid. 
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―they are too minor or trivial to warrant interference.‖28  Yet, this is not to discount those 
emotional distresses that can lead to significant mental breakdowns; ―however, it is the 
consequential harm to mental health and not the mere fact of distress‖ that initiates mental 
distress to harm that in turn necessitates coercion.
29
  However, there also seems to be an 
additional component to mental distress that neither leads to mental breakdown, nor ―hurt 
feelings.‖  This emotional component is often referred to as offense and many legal questions 
surround the regulation of those acts, prostitution included, that offend others.
30
  Before 
analyzing the regulation of offensive behavior, it is important to compare harm and offense in 
order to determine the relation between the two.                
Interestingly, a similar relation exists between harm and offense that exists with harm and 
hurt.  According to Feinberg they share six things in common: 
1.  Some harms do not offend (as some do not hurt). 
2.  All offenses (like all hurts) are harms, inasmuch as all men have an   
     interest in not being offended or hurt. 
3.  Some offenses (like some hurts) are symptoms or consequences of  
     prior or concurrent harms. 
4.  Some offenses (like some hurts) are causes of subsequent harms: in the  
     case of extreme hurt, harm to health; in the case of extreme offense,  
     harm from provoked ill will or violence.  These subsequent harms are  
     harms of a different order, i.e., violations of interests other than the  
     interest in not being hurt or offended. 
5.  Some offense, like some hurts, are ―harmless,‖ i.e., do not lead to any  
     further harm (violations of any interests other than the interest in not  
     being hurt or offended). 
6.  Although offense and hurt are in themselves harms, they are harms of a  
     relatively trivial kind (unless they are of sufficient magnitude to violate  
     interest in health and peace).
31
 
 
                                                 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid, 28. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
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This interpretation of offense and its relation to the harm principle seems to conclude that 
offense is not a significant enough reason to prevent an individual from performing a certain act.  
It must be noted that these offenses are not equivalent to hurts such as sorrow or distress.  
Offenses are similar in that they are unpleasant or disliked.  However, many reports on ―harmless 
offences‖ have been conducted (such as the British Wolfenden Report which will be discussed 
below) that seem to concur that in certain circumstances it is acceptable to regulate such 
offenses, even when they are ―harmless‖ while, the analogous hurting another‘s feelings, by 
calling them a name or ending a relationship for example, cannot be regulated.  For this reason, 
there is often a separate principle that deals with offense, known simply as the offense principle, 
which grants as acceptable the right of a state to prevent individuals from performing certain acts 
based on its moral offensiveness.
32
      
 The offense principle is often used in conjunction with other social ideas, such as 
paternalism and legal moralism, which attempt to regulate actions based on moral ideals.  These 
two social concepts are exactly the type of enforcement which Mill condemns as unacceptable, 
coercive control over individual liberty.  Paternalism is a ―liberty-limiting principle‖ which 
―justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm, or, in its extreme version, 
to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their own good.‖33  The idea that the state 
should control an individual for his/her own good or because it understands what citizens need 
better than the citizens themselves, seems to suggest that citizens are like children who do not 
know any better.  However, paternalism has always been a part of our legal system.  For 
example, it does not defy reason, as Feinberg suggests, that certain drugs should be regulated by 
the government or made illegal (both prescription drugs and drugs such as heroin or cocaine) 
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because of the risks associated with them.  However, this should not be allowed to be applied to 
every action in such a way that popular morality becomes endorsed by the state as ―for your own 
good.‖  Just as it sometimes seems to be acceptable for the state to regulate certain things, it also 
seems unacceptable for the state to control other things based on this paternalistic principle.  
When Mill was criticizing paternalism, he was claiming that the ―fully voluntary choice or 
consent (to another‘s doing) of a mature and rational human being concerns matters that directly 
affect only his own interest is so precious that no one else (especially the state) has a right to 
interfere with it simply for the person‘s ‗own good.‘‖34  A person‘s liberty should not be taken 
away if an action has the potential to cause harm to that individual.  Potential for harm or 
concern for an individual‘s own good, are not sufficient reasons for a state to interfere because it 
has the potential to ―create serious risks of governmental tyranny‖ when the state has ultimate 
authority on what is or is not for the public good.
35
  
The second liberty-limiting principle that is similar to paternalism is legal moralism, 
which is the idea that morality should be governed by the state.  So, on this view, when an 
individual sins against morality, that individual should be punished by the law for offending the 
public and going against popular morality.  Legal moralism is thus an attempt to legally enforce 
morality.  Most of the ―morals offenses‖ that legal moralism attempts to criminalize have to do 
with sexuality, such as prostitution, homosexuality, and incest, among others; however, other 
issues such as animal abuse and desecration of the flag are also seen as morals offenses.
36
  Legal 
moralism is what Mill was referencing when he said that oftentimes the custom or morality of 
the majority was forced upon those with a dissenting view.  Under legal moralism, which is 
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typically associated with the view of Patrick Devlin on the Wolfenden Report, the majority 
morality is legally enforced at the expense of private (self-regarding) acts of liberty.
37
  This view, 
espoused by Devlin, began the start of the Hart/Devlin debate, in which Patrick Devlin and HLA 
Hart analyze the decision of the British Wolfenden Report on the legal regulation of 
homosexuality and prostitution.     
Wolfenden Report and the Hart/Devlin Debate 
In considering the Hart/Devlin debate, one must look to the Report with which it began.  
The Wolfenden Report was commissioned in Britain in 1954 to analyze the law and its 
prosecution of homosexuality and prostitution.  The questions the committee was attempting to 
resolve were the legality of the acts and whether the current laws were sufficient or whether they 
needed to be amended.   
 The scope of the report is not to look at the morality or immorality of the act, but rather 
the effects it has on law and order.  The report claims that they ―recognize that we are here, 
again, on the difficult borderland between law and morals, and that this is debatable ground.‖38  
They further claim that they ―are concerned not with prostitution itself, but with the manner in 
which the activities of prostitutes  and those associated with them offend against public order and 
decency, expose the ordinary citizen to what is offensive or injurious, or involve the exploitation 
of others.‖39  While the purpose of the report is not to look into the morality of prostitution, it is 
evident that the committee views prostitution as a social evil that is immoral, going so far as to 
describe their purpose as looking into prostitution and ―solicitation for immoral purposes.‖40 
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(Italics mine).  The negative language against the prostitute is obvious. When referring to the 
pimp, the report claims (based on what evidence, it does not state) that the man may be the ―one 
humanizing element in the life of the woman,‖41 thus implying that the prostitute or the life of 
the prostitute is inhuman.   
While the Report presupposes the immorality of prostitution, it recognizes the unforced 
choice that many women make in leading a life of prostitution claiming the reason many women 
choose the life of prostitution is that it is ―easier, freer, and more profitable than would be 
provided by any other occupation.‖42  However, while the women may freely choose the life of 
prostitution, the prostitute‘s rights are not the priority of the committee.  They claim that ―the 
right of the normal, decent citizen to go about the streets without affront to his or her sense of 
decency should be the prime consideration and should take precedence over the interests of the 
prostitute and her customers.‖43  The primary question is whether prostitution offends society, 
and if so, how the law should be used to protect those citizens.  In discussing how the law should 
be enacted, the Wolfenden report recognizes the argument that prostitution would cease to exist 
if there were no customers and thus analyzes who should be punished in cases of solicitation.  
Since, they argue, the purpose of the law is to protect the citizens from indecency and 
―annoyance,‖ the party that offends should be the one punished.  In the case of prostitution, the 
prostitutes offend the public, so the prostitute should be punished.  The answer the committee 
states in the report is that ―the simple fact is that prostitutes do parade themselves more 
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habitually and openly than their prospective customers‖ and thus offend where the 
customer/solicitor does not, therefore they should be punished more fully than the customer.
44
 
While the report discusses various options and solutions to how the law should relate to 
prostitution and homosexuality.  The primary problem that Lord Patrick Devlin has with the 
report is the committee‘s opinion that immorality within the private sphere is not a matter for the 
law.  The report recognizes that in Britain prostitution as such, is not illegal, only the affront to 
decency and ―annoyance‖ that it has on society or third parties.45  Devlin, in fact, argues that it 
does not make sense to refer to a private sphere of morality and a public sphere as being 
separate, and thus untouchable for the law.  He claims that it is nonsense to ―talk sensibly of a 
public and private morality any more than one can of a public or private highway.  Morality is a 
sphere in which there is a public interest and a private interest, often in conflict, and the problem 
is to reconcile the two.‖46    On this issue, Devlin takes a view very much opposed to the Report, 
namely that it is not a matter for the law to determine private and public immorality in order to 
create laws, but rather, the lawmakers have the responsibility to create laws which preserve 
morality and as such there is no division between the public and the private. 
Part of Devlin‘s argument stems from his conception of society and what determines 
society.  Devlin believes that society is ―a community of ideas‖ and ―without shared ideas on 
politics, morals and ethics, no society can exist.‖47  He argues that ‗public morality‘ is such that 
it is inseparable from the law.  By public morality, Devlin means what every ―right-minded‖ 
person would believe about a specific issue.  However, the ―right-minded‖ person is the 
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―reasonable man.  He is not to be confused with the rational man.  He is not expected to reason 
about anything and his judgments may be largely a matter of feeling.‖48  So in the case of 
prostitution, if it offends the right-minded person, it goes against the public morality and should 
be prosecutable because public morality is the basis for society‘s cohesion.  If there was not a 
public morality, then there would not be a society, so the preservation of this morality should be 
regulated by the law.  If this is the case, as Devlin believes, then it makes no sense to discuss 
private and public morality because what happens within the confines of the society affects its 
cohesion, private or not.
49
   
Devlin draws a parallel between homosexuality (which could easily be substituted with 
prostitution) and treason.  He argues that subversion is a threat to society and goes against the 
cohesion of society.  Even if a single individual is subverting society, it affects the whole.  In a 
similar manner he claims homosexuality and prostitution threaten society.  He claims that the act 
of homosexuality, even if it be between two consenting adults, is immoral, and as such, affects 
the whole of society.  He claims that ―the law exists for the protection of society,‖ not the 
individual as the Wolfenden report claims.  Since the law exists to protect society,  
it does not discharge its function by protecting the individual from injury, 
annoyance, corruption and exploitation; the law must protect also the institution 
and community of ideas, political and moral, without which people cannot live 
together.  Society cannot ignore the morality of the individual any more than it 
can his loyalty; it flourishes on both and without either it dies.
50
 
 
This parallel rests solely on the assumption that homosexuality and prostitution are immoral.  
There is no argument presented, just as there is no argument present in the Wolfenden report as 
to why these activities are or are not moral.  However, if Devlin is correct that no distinction can 
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be made between public and private morality, it is the necessary place of the law to step in and 
regulate any act that is deemed immoral, not by reason, but common sense morality that is found 
in any right-minded (though not rational) individual.   
 In response to Devlin‘s article, HLA Hart claims that Devlin makes several key mistakes 
in his understanding of society, which leads him to the faulty conclusions he makes.  Hart claims 
that morality, for the most part was thought to have been derived from either a divine nature or 
through reason.  If, however, as Devlin states, that morality does not come from reason, as, 
remember, the reasonable man is not to be mistaken with the rational man, then they come from 
the divine, in which case the previous methods in which he discussed morals are problematic.
51
  
This problem arises from points that Devlin himself makes in his article.
52
  Hart points out that in 
Devlin‘s article he lists three things that the right-minded man must feel toward a specific act in 
order for it to be a part of the moral law.  These three feelings, intolerance, indignation, and 
disgust, are the requirements that must be had by the reasonable man in order to make the act 
immoral according to moral law.  This argument, for Hart, is untenable, because as Devlin 
himself points out, the required feelings against a particular act may subside and widespread 
toleration may take its place in society.  In which case, does that make the act less of a threat to 
society?
53
  It seems as though the argument that Devlin presents, namely, that if these three 
feelings are present, an act is against moral law, but the levels of toleration in society towards the 
acts often shift, so then it ceases to be against moral law.  It seems odd that an act changes in 
moral propriety when feelings change because if the acts are not based in reason as Devlin 
claims they are not, then it stands to reason as Hart claims they would be divine, and if divine, 
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they would not change as public sentiment changed, they would remain moral law no matter 
public sentiments. 
 For Hart, the argument that Devlin presents is misleading.  Hart believes that Devlin is 
taking the position of Mill in On Liberty and changing it to suit his needs without necessarily 
applying it as presented by Mill.
54
  The liberal argument as stated by Mill is that any act that 
causes harm to another should be legally prohibited.  Devlin takes this and draws the parallel 
between physical harm and harm to the moral code.  This parallel, however, is deceptive.  It is 
not the case, argues Hart, that if one performs an immoral act which goes against the moral code 
that society as a whole with fall apart.  This is Devlin‘s argument for the relation between treason 
and homosexuality.  However, the analogy that Devlin creates here is meant to show how the act 
of an individual has the ability to harm the moral code, and thus society as a whole, despite the 
―private‖ nature of the homosexual act.  However, the parallel only works, Hart argues if a 
treasonous act can be performed privately.  This, Hart argues is ―absurd.‖  Treason is 
undermining the government, which by its very nature cannot be done in private, but must be 
public, since the government is public.  Homosexuality and prostitution, however, are private.  
He claims that ―we must listen to the promptings of common sense and of logic, and say that 
though there could not logically be a sphere of private treason there is a sphere of private 
morality and immorality.‖55   
 So, Hart believes that Devlin‘s premise that society is determined by the moral code as 
intuited by the right-minded man who feels intolerance, indignation, and disgust toward immoral 
acts is based on a misunderstanding of what society is.  He further believes that the analogy 
drawn between treason and homosexuality does not stand.  These two arguments are important 
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for Devlin‘s argument.  However, as Hart points out, the survival of the society is not dependant 
on these three feelings of the reasonable man to remain intact and whole.   
 Ronald Dworkin, in analyzing Devlin‘s position, argues that Devlin performs ―an 
intellectual sleight of hand.‖56  Dworkin claims that Devlin makes ―public outrage … a threshold 
criterion, merely placing the [perceived immoral] practice in a category which the law is not 
forbidden to regulate. … [and] this threshold criterion becomes itself a dispositive affirmative 
reason for action‖ by the law.57  Here Devlin does not offer any supporting claims that 
homosexuality or prostitution does in fact pose a threat to society, only that deviation from the 
moral code does.  He merely assumes that these acts are immoral.
58
  Another issue that Dworkin 
has with Devlin‘s argument is that he does not provide an adequate distinction between prejudice 
and the feelings of outrage that members of society may feel toward a certain act.  In fact, many 
of the examples that Devlin presents rely on feelings and specifically exclude reason.  However, 
looking to the reasons why one has specific feelings about an act is important in distinguishing 
between a moral law and plain prejudice.  The example that Dworkin uses is how one‘s views 
would be perceived in a court of law.  In other words, would the reason be seen as prejudicial or 
based on some legitimate cause.  If the latter proves to be the case, then Devlin is misleading in 
his argument.
59
 
 The Wolfenden Report, in looking into the link between morality and the law, a subject 
that the committee itself recognized as ―debatable ground,‖60 provided a platform for the 
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renewed debate as to the acceptability of the state to regulate morality.   Lord Patrick Devlin and 
HLA Hart both believe in the immorality of prostitution and homosexuality that is stated in the 
Wolfenden Report, however, both men derive very different interpretations of society and the 
permissibility of the law in interfering in acts between consenting adults.  Part of this stems from 
the misconception that Devlin has about society and the role of the law.  However, a key point 
that neither men discusses is whether the two topics, namely prostitution and homosexuality, are 
in fact immoral.  This question, whether prostitution and homosexuality are immoral, requires 
further investigation as opposed to the assumed position is has among the immoral.      
Conclusion 
 Prostitution is often discussed in the law as ―harmless wrongdoing‖ or a ―victimless 
crime.‖  In other words, the act is wrong but there are no victims or harm caused to others.  This 
type of discussion is problematic because the central idea behind the argument does not question 
the moral permissibility or impermissibility of prostitution, because both sides tend to grant that 
it is wrong without argument.  From here there are discussions and arguments as presented in the 
Wolfenden report that then look to whether the law is responsible or should enact laws to 
prosecute the offenders.  The issue then turns to the effects of prosecuting such acts, and 
concludes, on a utilitarian position, that prostitution is difficult and costly to prosecute because it 
tends to occur in private, and thus should not be illegal on a practical basis.   
Those who argue against prostitution being made legal are arguing from some moral 
principle that is taken for granted as being valid and correct.  They accept the idea of legal 
paternalism or legal moralism that what is wrong should be illegal and that the law should 
regulate morality for the citizen‘s ‗own good.‘  However, these arguments need to be explored 
and explained before they can be simply granted.  There needs to be a reason to accept or reject 
25 
 
the claim that prostitution is immoral, and the remainder of this work will analyze the moral 
positions of various theories to determine the morality of prostitution instead of granting that 
prostitution is immoral and proceeding from there.  Chapter two will explore three popular moral 
theories that claim prostitution is immoral to see if the theories stand up as acceptable moral 
theories.   
However, as this chapter analyzed with Mill, it is not at all clear that if an action is 
morally impermissible that it should be made illegal.  As Socrates discussed in the Crito, what is 
legal and what is morally right do not always coincide.  Simply because something is made legal 
or illegal does not necessarily have any moral bearing on the act.  As Mill rightly states, the 
government should not be able to regulate self-concerning acts or acts between freely consenting 
adults that do not harm the interests (in the sense discussed by Feinberg) of third parties.  To 
restate the point, simply because the act is immoral should have no bearing on the issue of 
legality.  The only considerations the law should take into account are the protection of the rights 
of its citizens from physical harm and harm of their interests.  Unless some provable harm is 
being caused, as can be seen in the examples of theft and murder, acts of individuals should not 
be infringed upon or legislated.  Further, in the case of prostitution, where there is no provable 
harm when performed between two consenting adults, it should not be legislated, even if 
immoral.   
The argument in chapter three will turn to liberal theories of consent which argue that 
prostitution is morally acceptable.  I will argue for the even stronger position that not only should 
prostitution not be illegal even if it is immoral, but rather it is in fact morally permissible and not 
wrong at all if performed under certain parameters between consenting adults.   
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CHAPTER TWO: 
PROSTITUTION AS MORALLY IMPERMISSIBLE 
Many sexual acts, such as prostitution, are assumed immoral ipso facto. Chapter one 
analyzed the arguments presented in the Wolfenden Report as to whether prostitution should or 
should not be legalized.  The arguments on both sides granted that prostitution and 
homosexuality were morally wrong but provided different reasons as to why it should or should 
not be allowed.  However, all arguments not only failed to provide an adequate explanation for 
why prostitution is morally impermissible, they failed to provide an explanation at all.  People 
tend to have strong feelings about the morality of certain sexual acts; however, when pressed, 
have a difficult time explaining why they believe they are morally impermissible.  If given a list 
of sexual practices, many people will easily label the morally acceptable and unacceptable.  
However, certain acts, such as prostitution and homosexuality, are often sources of contention.  
What is it about prostitution, as such, that would make it morally impermissible?  This chapter 
explores three commonly defended sexual ethical views that uphold the immorality of 
prostitution: 1. ―naturalistic theories‖ which are typically espoused by the Catholic Church, 
specifically Thomas Aquinas in discussing natural law, though others hold a variation of the 
view that look to the science of sex without harboring the religious implications; 2.  the ―sex with 
love view‖ which bases the morality of a sexual act on the expression of love within a 
heterosexual marriage; and 3. the ―radical feminist view‖ which argues that inherent in society 
and thus, all heterosexual sexual acts, is a subjugation of women, and therefore, any act of 
heterosexual sex is morally impermissible.  While all three theories argue that prostitution is 
immoral, they use very different vehicles to arrive at their points.  An understanding and analysis 
of the three views is thus crucial to determine if the assumed stance, that prostitution is immoral, 
taken in the Wolfenden Report is at all founded.  
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Naturalistic Theories of Sexual Ethics 
  
One of the most common defenses of conventional sexual morality, which has a variety 
of secular formulations, nevertheless, stems from natural law theory which is generally attributed 
to Saint Thomas Aquinas and upheld by the Catholic Church.  In order to fully understand the 
ethical implications of natural law theory on sexual acts, it is important to understand the 
umbrella theory under which this sexual ethical view rests. The concept of natural law, typical in 
the religious tradition, considers the nature of human beings and their proper end or function.  
This notion of ‗proper ends‘ is borrowed from the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle claims 
there is a proper end or function for human beings and all other natural objects.  According to 
Aristotle, the natural function of humans is reason, which contributes to flourishing or well-being 
(which is the highest human good) in the human soul.  This leads to the argument that all human 
actions and behaviors must be conducive to the proper end of humans which then contributes to a 
person either leading a flourishing human life or failing to flourish.
61
  However, while natural 
law, as formulated by Aquinas, stems from Aristotelian teleology, the best place to begin the 
analysis of naturalistic sexual ethics is with the concepts Aquinas himself develops.
62
    
According to Aquinas, there are several laws to which humans must adhere; they are 
eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law.
63
  Aquinas claims that ―a law is nothing else 
but a dictate of practical reason‖ which comes from ―the ruler‖ of a ―community‖ and in the case 
of this world, the ruler is ―Divine Providence,‖ or God, which in turn means the world is 
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governed by divine reason.  And because God is eternal, this law would be eternal law.
64
  
According to Aquinas, ―since all things subject to Divine Providence are ruled and measured by 
the eternal law, … it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law… [and it is 
through eternal law that] they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.‖65  
Because of this, and since humans are rational, they partake in eternal reason more so than the 
other animals.  When humans do so, they derive their proper end and acts from eternal reason 
and for Thomas, ―it is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else then the rational 
creature‘s participation of the eternal law.‖66  So, when humans act in a manner that is consistent 
with reason, they act in partial fulfillment of their end because participation in the eternal law 
through reason is the function or end of humans.   Aquinas claims that  
Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to 
nature:…for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known 
naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the 
natural appetite in respect of the last end.  Accordingly the first direction of our 
acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.
67
 
 
Natural law, then, is the mechanism through which humans understand the proper manner in 
which they should act.   
Natural law is action-guiding and arises in humans as a ‗natural‘ almost instinctual 
inclination.  For Aquinas, the proper inclination for humans is to act according to reason.
68
  So, 
when humans act in accordance with their nature, Thomas claims they are acting in a manner 
that is ―good.‖  This   
good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, 
which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of 
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good.  Consequently the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on 
the notion of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after.
69
 
 
Thus, for Aquinas, the general idea behind law, natural and otherwise, is that the ―good is to be 
done and ensued, and evil is to be avoided.‖70  When one does this, one is acting properly 
towards natural law, because ―all other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that 
whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the 
precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.‖71    
However, while natural law is instinctual, many of the acts governed by natural law are 
not something a human can know with his/her limited faculty for reasoning.  Some things are 
beyond human reason because while humans participate in eternal reason, this eternal reason 
stems from divine reason, which cannot be completely knowable to humans with their limited 
faculties.  Thus, divine law is necessary to enable humans to fully realize their proper good 
because divine law introduces certain elements to the individual that are necessary for the 
individual to fulfill not only the natural function of the body, but the soul as well.  So, in one 
sense, natural law is a species of divine law.   Thomas claims that ―since man is ordained to an 
end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty… it was necessary that 
besides the natural and the human law man should be directed to his end by a law given by God 
[i.e. divine law].‖72  Since divine law is thus unknowable to humans but influences human 
actions through reason, when reason is ignored it prevents one from flourishing.  Thomas 
believes ―any law that is rightly established promotes virtue. Now, virtue consists in this: that 
both the inner feelings and the use of corporeal things be regulated by reason. So, this is 
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something to be provided for by divine law.‖73  So, natural law is a subset of divine law and 
since they stem from the same source, they ultimately seek the same thing: human good.  
Thomas utilizes this understanding of divine law to claim that if an act prevents one from using 
reason, then it is forbidden because ―only those things that are opposed to reason are prohibited 
by divine law.‖74  However, natural law also prohibits those things that are opposed to reason.  
Aquinas claims  
As man‘s mind is subordinated to God, so is the body subordinated to the soul, 
and the lower powers to reason. … Therefore, man must be so ordered by divine 
law that his lower powers may be subject to reason, and his body to his soul, and 
so that external things may subserve the needs of man.
75
 
 
In other words, natural law is provided to humans in such a way by divine law that the actions 
one performs under the dictates of natural law are consistent with and ordered by divine law.  So, 
the actions that one performs with one‘s body either help or hinder the soul since ―it is good for 
each person to attain his end, whereas it is bad for him to swerve away from his proper end.‖76   
When one allows the desires of the body, which is a lower power, to overrule reason, then a 
human is acting contrary to his/her nature which in turn, means acting against his/her end.     
Aquinas further argues that this concept ―should be considered applicable to the parts, 
just as it is to the whole being; for instance, each and every part of man, and every one of his 
acts, should attain the proper end.‖77  If a part of an agent does not function properly, it affects 
the entire agent.  For example, if a person decides to cut off his/her perfectly healthy and 
functioning leg, it affects the overall life of the agent since the body no longer functions as it 
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should and this act does not promote the good of the agent.  Just as if an agent‘s goal is to 
graduate from school, the act of not going to class affects the overall outcome of the goal.  So, 
each act and decision that the agent makes impacts the overall achievement of his/her proper end.  
Aquinas ultimately argues that ―Actions are morally appropriate insofar as they accord with our 
nature and end as human beings and morally inappropriate insofar as they fail to accord with our 
nature and end as human beings.‖78   
Since humans are naturally inclined to act in a manner that promotes their good, they 
share certain things ―which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, education 
of offspring and so forth.‖79  All actions that a human performs are supposed to be aimed toward 
his/her good.  Aquinas, then, depends upon natural law to understand what is natural and 
unnatural for a human to do to determine whether such acts are a fulfillment of the human good.  
So, when Aquinas turns his analysis to sexual ethics, he concludes that the sex act must be 
guided by reason and performed only when it fulfills its proper human function.  To understand 
the proper function of sex, he investigates the male body and semen specifically looking for how 
it contributes to the good of men and claims that  
though the male semen is superfluous in regard to the preservation of the 
individual, it is nevertheless necessary in regard to the propagation of the species. 
Other superfluous things, such as excrement, urine, sweat, and such things, are 
not at all necessary; hence, their emission contributes to man‘s good. Now, this is 
not what is sought in the case of semen, but, rather, to emit it for the purpose of 
generation, to which purpose the sexual act is directed.
80
 
 
Since Aquinas concludes that preservation of the species is a natural inclination in humans that is 
governed by natural law, he argues that the purpose of emitting semen is for propagation of the 
                                                 
78
 Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, ―Sexual Morality‖ in Social Ethics: Morality 
and Social Policy, 5
th
 ed.  (New York: The McGraw Hill Companies, 1997) 151. 
79
 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 94:2. 
80
 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III, ―Providence,‖ Part II, 122:4. 
32 
 
species, and thus the natural end of that action.  Since the natural end of the action is to produce 
offspring, and performing this act for any other reason would be going against this natural end, 
sexual intercourse for any other purpose would be bad or unnatural.
81
  However, this seems to be 
begging the question.  Aquinas is essentially arguing that everything has a function and emitting 
semen produces offspring and thus propagates the species, therefore the sex act in which semen 
is emitted should only and always be done to propagate the species.  However, simply because 
semen is essential in the propagation of the species, does not necessarily mean that it is the only 
function of sex.  Sex is and can be done for other reasons.  Additionally, there is no reason to 
suppose each act only has one function.  The function of the nose can be said to breathe, but it is 
also used to smell and aids in taste.  So, which is the ‗proper‘ function of the nose and if one uses 
the nose to smell, is the agent using the nose immorally or badly?  It seems unlikely.   
Aquinas further argues that since the purpose of sex is for the generation of offspring, the 
offspring must be taken care of as well.  If they were not, he claims, the function would be 
thwarted; ―therefore, the emission of semen ought to be so ordered that it will result in both the 
production of the proper offspring and in the upbringing of this offspring.‖82  Here, he links the 
sex act with the raising of children in a way that does not seem necessary.  The ―union of male 
and female‖ during the sex act and reproduction alone is not enough to fulfill the proper function 
of sex, the ―union of male and female‖ socially is also a requirement because, as he argues  
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since among all animals it is necessary for male and female to remain together as 
long as the work of the father is needed by the offspring, it is natural to the human 
being for the man to establish a lasting association with a designated woman, over 
no short period of time. Now, we call this society matrimony. Therefore, 
matrimony is natural for man, and promiscuous performance of the sexual act, 
outside matrimony, is contrary to man‘s good. For this reason, it must be a sin.83 
 
Aquinas comes to this conclusion about man after reasoning that any animal, not only man, 
requires the father to be present so long as he is needed by the offspring.  So, for instance, in the 
case of dogs, the father is not a necessary part of the upbringing of offspring, and thus, dogs do 
not require monogamous relationships and thus, such relationships are unnatural for dogs.  For 
Thomas, humans, however, in general, require both parents to raise the offspring, and thus, 
monogamy is natural for humans.  Here, he argues that he is not referring to specific individual 
cases, where, for instance a woman has the means to independently support a child.  He is 
speaking of the general species of humans, which do in fact, he claims, require the presence of 
both parties.
84
  So, not only is the natural function of sex procreation, it is only acceptable within 
the bounds of matrimony because it is the social institution that best promotes the raising of 
children, any other form becomes a sin, and thus immoral.  Even sexual acts within marriage are 
limited to vaginal intercourse because this is the only form of marital sex that leads to offspring.  
By arguing thus, Aquinas attempts to instill marriage and monogamy with positive moral 
value.
85
 
Aquinas states that if one deliberately has sex for any other reason, it is a sin and ―sins of 
this type are called contrary to nature.‖86  He does, however, qualify this and claims that he is 
―speaking of a way from which, in itself, generation could not result: such would be any 
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emission of semen apart from the natural union of male and female. … But, if by accident 
generation cannot result from the emission of semen, then this is not a reason for it being against 
nature, or a sin; as for instance, if the woman happens to be sterile.‖87  There are some instances, 
like the previous example Aquinas provides that seem to counter his argument.  It appears as 
though, according to his argument, the sex act between infertile partners cannot be permissible if 
there is no possible way for offspring to result, if indeed the only proper function is reproduction.  
Significantly, if a person is sterile, they cannot fulfill the function and would be going against the 
proper end in engaging in intercourse.  An argument can be made that Aquinas himself claims he 
is speaking of humans in general.  So, individual cases should not be taken into consideration, 
only what is the human good and proper function of humans.  For instance, in the above example 
he provides about individual cases in which a woman can independently raise a child being 
immoral, despite the ability to raise the child independently, seems to apply to individual cases 
of infertility which should also not be an exception.  If an exception cannot be made for single 
motherhood, which fulfills the function of sex by both producing offspring and raising the 
offspring, why can an exception be made for an infertile couple who can in no way fulfill either 
function?  It does not seem as though it should if one is considering the good and function of 
humans as a group. 
Consider, however, ‗prostitution‘ within marriage, or an exchange of money (or some 
other good) for sex within the confines of marriage.  It could be the case that a woman agrees to 
have sex with her husband for the purpose of procreation but only insofar as he pays her to do so 
or takes her to dinner, or buys her a car, shoes, desk, etc.  The morality of this situation does not 
seem to be clearly understood under Aquinas‘ argument.  The action is performed in accordance 
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with its proper function, within the proper context of marriage and the offspring are tended to; 
however, it is only performed on the condition of an exchange.  This example seems to fulfill the 
requirements for morality and the extra element does not clearly void the act of its morality.  So, 
it seems that the requirement of payment has no moral bearings on the act in question on 
Thomas‘ account.  However, prostitution, in its usual form is performed outside of marriage for a 
reason other than procreation.    
Aquinas condemns all sex outside of heterosexual marriage not performed for 
reproduction.  Prostitution, which, one can argue, can be performed for the purpose of 
procreation, does not involve marriage, and therefore would be immoral because it is a species of 
what he refers to as ―simple sex,‖ i.e. all sex acts outside of marriage for a reason other than 
procreation.  Aquinas acknowledges that many people believed that what he refers to as ―simple 
sex,‖ does not seem to be immoral.  He admits that there are critics who argue if there is a 
woman, who is not married or ―under the control of any man, either her father or another man‖ 
(today, while this statement may raise eyebrows, it can be understood to mean an independent, 
single, adult female) and  
if a man performs the sexual act with her, and she is willing, he does not injure 
her, because she favors the action and she has control over her own body. Nor 
does he injure any other person, because she is understood to be under no other 
person‘s control. So, this does not seem to be a sin.88 
 
However, this argument is, in his opinion, defeated when he makes the claim that humans are 
harmed when they do something that is against their end/function.  Aquinas‘ argument seems to 
rely on the idea that what is contrary to a human‘s good is immoral.  However, simply because 
something is contrary to man‘s good does not necessarily make it immoral, merely bad for that 
person and not everything that is bad is immoral.  Eating fast food is bad for a person and would 
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perhaps harm his/her overall well-being, but it would not be considered immoral.  Sex outside of 
marriage may be bad for a person or not conducive to a person‘s happiness, but this does not and 
should not make it immoral.  Aquinas does not seem to make a distinction between acts that have 
a moral bearing on the agent and acts that do not, such as, for instance when someone does 
something for pleasure (eating fast food, engaging in prostitution, playing tennis).  Just because 
something does not fulfill its function, does not mean it is morally wrong as Aquinas seems to 
insist.  Even Aristotle, from whom Aquinas borrows heavily, does not seem to judge sex and 
sensual pleasures as harshly as Aquinas. 
Since Aquinas relies upon Aristotle for his argument, it may be possible to refute 
Aquinas‘ interpretation of natural law using Aristotelian philosophy.  A possible critique of 
Thomas can be based on the fact that for Aristotle, sexual acts ―fall into the sphere of sensual 
pleasure, which is governed by the virtue temperance.‖89  And thus, many of Thomas‘ 
conclusions do not always apply to certain sexual acts outside of marriage when considered in 
this light because unlike Thomas, Aristotle advocates moderation and temperance in acts that 
seem to allow for a wider variety of acts, depending on the situation.  The virtue temperance, 
oftentimes understood as moderation, is difficult to define in sexual terms because Aristotle is 
often vague as to what exactly fits into temperate sexual acts.  With sexual acts, it must be ―with 
the right people, to the right degree, on the right occasions, with the right goals.‖90  However, he 
does not give many examples or parameters to judge the proper amounts, situations, etc because 
it depends on the individual situation.  However, one act Aristotle does address is adultery and 
condemns it based upon the fact that certain things are bad and have no mean or moderate act.  
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He claims that ―goodness or badness with regard to such things [do not] depend on committing 
adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of 
them is to go wrong.‖91   However, when Aristotle speaks of the sensual desires a temperate 
person would have, he claims that while the desires should be moderate, as long as they do not 
harm or prevent the end of humans, they are acceptable.  This provides both a ―positive and wide 
content.‖92  Many sexual acts can be included because they do not threaten the end of humans.  
What Aristotle excludes are those acts that are contrary to the noble, beyond the person‘s means, 
or unhealthy.  So, when considering prostitution, which Thomas would condemn as being against 
the function of sex, Aristotle would find such an act acceptable if it was performed in moderation 
with a willing participant because the act of sex, whether it produces offspring or not, does not 
harm the person or his/her overall interests.  It may, therefore, be temperate for one person to 
perform a sexual act with a prostitute and wrong for another.  It is also interesting to note that 
Aristotle does not classify things as natural and unnatural as Thomas does, but temperate or 
intemperate (vice).  So, there may be an act, such as prostitution, that Thomas would condemn as 
unnatural that Aristotle would see as perfectly acceptable.  However, Aristotle does have a view 
of ―good sex‖ and compares every other sex act to this ideal, yet, just because it does not meet 
the ideal, does not mean it is immoral.
93
  Similarly, simply because someone has sex for a reason 
other than procreation, may mean that it falls short of the function of sex, but not that it is 
immoral.   
So, to sum up Thomas‘ natural law view, humans should only act in those ways that 
fulfill their function as humans.  Since everything a human does impacts his/her function, every 
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act should be conducive to that end.  When one performs a sexual act, it should only be done in a 
manner consistent with its function.  The function of sex is reproduction and the upbringing of 
that offspring in a marriage.  So, any form of sex other than this fails to fulfill the function and is 
thus morally wrong.  However, Thomas makes some significant mistakes in his analysis.  One, 
he fails to make the distinction between an act not fulfilling its function and that act being 
immoral.  Two, he assumes that everything has a single function.  Three, he adds the extraneous 
elements of marriage and the raising of offspring into the function of sex which seems 
unfounded.  Finally, he fails to consider that procreation may be the ideal situation not the 
normal or proper function of sex.  It could be that in failing to have sex for procreation, one is 
failing to live up to the ideal, but even then, simply failing to live up to an ideal does not make an 
act wrong.  Thus, while prostitution may be considered morally impermissible on his view, his 
view is fraught with problems. 
Another similar attempt to appeal to the function of sex while remaining religiously 
neutral looks to the biological function of human sexuality and, like Thomas, tends to argue that 
the natural function of sex is for reproduction.  This socio-biological view looks to a biological 
understanding of sex and claims that procreation is the natural (i.e. biological) function or 
purpose of sex and any sexual act done for reasons other than the potential for  procreation is 
morally wrong or sexually perverse.  Since reproduction is the natural function of sex, sex is only 
acceptable if performed to reproduce.  This, however, seems overly strict.  There are several 
situations in which humans use certain body parts for something other than their ‗natural‘ or 
‗biological‘ function and this appears perfectly acceptable and, if not morally acceptable, 
certainly not morally condemnable.  For example, people often wear rings on their fingers and in 
their ears, use their nose and ears to hold on glasses, and use their mouth to hold things when 
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their hands are not free, all of which, while not the biological function of such things, are 
completely acceptable or morally neutral. So, it seems unreasonable to suggest that if the 
biological function of something is not fulfilled it is perverse and therefore morally unacceptable.  
This could also be the case with sex.  Those who hold this socio-biological view seem to suggest 
(as does Thomas) that if it is not for the purpose, it is automatically immoral.  This does not seem 
to hold.  However, as Barbara MacKinnon states, some who hold this socio-biological view seem 
to believe that the act is acceptable if it has the potential to lead to procreation.  This does not 
make the intention to reproduce necessary, only acting in such a way that the opportunity is 
present.  In other words, only ―that which interferes with or seeks deliberately to frustrate this 
natural purpose of sexual intercourse.‖94  This seems to accept all forms of vaginal intercourse in 
which birth control methods are not used.  Prostitution, in this case very well may be acceptable, 
so long as there are not contraceptives used because it would not interfere with or frustrate the 
potential for offspring, especially since this view does not always link the reproductive purpose 
of sex to the necessity of marriage as natural law tends to do.  According to this view, 
prostitution, adultery, rape, pre-marital sex, can all be suitable sexual methods, since all can lead 
to procreation or can be done for the purpose of reproduction.  Nevertheless, these types of sex 
can still be condemned on other grounds, such as coercion (in the case of rape) or breaking of a 
vow (as in adultery and some acts of prostitution).
95
   
The socio-biological function argument, as well as the Thomistic natural law theory, has 
more work to do to maintain that the only function of sex is reproduction.  Igor Primoratz 
correctly claims that while reproduction is a function of sex, so is expression of love or emotion, 
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as well as physical enjoyment.  So, while it may be the case that reproduction is a purpose of sex, 
it is not the only purpose of sex for humans.  To claim that humans who have sex to express 
emotion, or to enjoy it physically and not to reproduce are morally wrong seems to be a faulty 
conclusion.
96
  Even if it is the case that procreation is the natural function of sex, there is still a 
―gap between the natural, thus defined, and the morally proper.‖97  There is not an argument for 
the connection between unnatural and immoral.  Further, it could be plausible for someone to put 
forth a ‗natural law‘ argument that biologically explains homosexuality or other types of sex.  
For example, one can argue that gay men and lesbian women have a ‗natural‘ biological 
inclination toward desiring their own gender, and this is thus, ―natural‖ to them.98  And further, 
though controversial, some could argue that anything that a human desires comes from nature, 
and is thus natural.  For example, the ‗plain sex view,‘ as described by Alan Goldman, bases 
sexual perversion on statistics as opposed to a moral ideology.
99
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Goldman claims that ―sex continues to be misrepresented … in philosophical writings [which] 
attribute a necessary external goal or purpose to sexual activity, whether it be reproduction, the 
expression of love, simple communication, or interpersonal awareness.‖  According to this view, 
an act is sexually perverse if it is statistically uncommon and not perverse if it is common.  The 
concept is based on ―a norm, but is merely statistical, rather than moral or aesthetic.‖  This 
definition removes the connection between perversions, morality, and quality.  A certain act can 
be perverted and yet still be moral, for example, if sex within marriage were to become 
statistically uncommon, it would be perverted on this view, but not viewed as immoral.  
Furthermore, the sexual inclination that homosexual men have could be explained as ‗natural‘ 
and not perverse because it is statistically common.  On this definition of perversion, prostitution 
would not be perverted at all, since it is statistically common.  A typical criticism of this view is 
that pedophilia and other typical ―perversions‖ would not be considered perversions at all.  
However, since Goldman divorces morality from his definition, there is not necessarily a 
―problem‖ with these acts not being a perversion yet still being immoral.  They are separate 
questions.  However, there seems to be little point in using the term at all if it is simply based on 
a statistical abnormality.  If the condemnatory aspect of the definition is left out, the entire use of 
the word should be left out, according to Primoratz, because it seems unlikely that the moral 
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Nevertheless, these arguments against naturalistic theories focus on what seems to be the 
central issue of such theories, namely, what exactly do the proponents mean by ―natural‖ and is 
there really a single case of ―natural sex?‖  So, while Primoratz correctly argues that the 
argument ultimately fails to link natural functions and morality in any meaningful way, how does 
prostitution fare under its dictates?  If we recall that the sole criteria of a sexual encounter being 
morally acceptable  according to the socio-biological view is its potential for the procreation, on 
this view, prostitution, as such, cannot be condemned as being morally wrong because it can lead 
to reproduction, though, admittedly, it typically does not.  However, if birth control or a sterile 
partner is involved, prostitution can become morally unacceptable.  But as it stands, prostitution 
in itself is not impermissible when understood in these socio-biological terms.  Yet, under the 
natural law theory of Thomas, if a sexual act is not done for reproduction and there is no 
marriage involved, it is immoral.  Nevertheless, the actual argument that Thomas sets up is 
problematic and his link to the proper function of sex and immorality is strained and 
unconvincing.  Simply because prostitution does not fulfill the function of sex, does not mean it 
is immoral.  Additionally, the link between the function of sex and marriage for the purpose of 
raising offspring is extraneous and is not adequately defended.  
The Necessary Expression of Love in Sex 
 
Another ethical view that defends much of conventional sexual morality is put forth by 
Roger Scruton in his book, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic.  Scruton argues that 
the natural function of sex is not procreation, but to express love while recognizing the other 
human being as the unique individual he/she is.  This is not to say as an individual, but as that 
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distinguish sexually common from uncommon, has no moral import at all, and serves simply as a 
statistical catalogue of human sexuality.   
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specific individual.  For Scruton, sexual perversions, which are immoral, are ―all deviations from 
the unity of animal and interpersonal relation‖ (i.e. impersonal sex).100  Sex should, according to 
Scruton, represent recognition of the ―personal existence of the other.‖101  To defend his thesis, 
Scruton first discusses sexual desire, sexual arousal, and personhood before turning to his 
conclusions on sexual morality, which coincides with many ideas found within conventional 
sexual ethics.  He claims his view of sexual desire will not be based in religion but in human 
nature, nevertheless, it will utilize religious ideas because ―erotic and religious sentiments show 
a peculiar isomorphism… [and] religious experience provides the securest everyday background 
to sexual morality.‖102  In fact, Scruton makes a bold claim, one that seems to echo the words of 
the Humanae Vitae, that ―it needs little observation to recognize that our civilization has suffered 
a profound crisis in sexual behavior and in sexual morality.‖103  While he does not defend this 
claim, he believes that his text and the moral view he presents would go a long way to improve 
what he sees as the current crisis. 
The primary theory Scruton attempts to address and refute is the idea that sexuality and 
the sex act are properly understood as an instinctual and animalistic aspect of human behavior.  
He claims that ―according to this view, our animal nature is the principal vehicle of sexual desire, 
and provides its overriding motive.  In desire we act and feel as animals; indeed, desire is a 
motive which all sexual beings—including the majority of animals—share.‖104  However, for 
Scruton, it is not animal instinct that motivates sexual desire, but rather a complex system of 
rational intentions.  He argues for this by considering and comparing arousal, desire, and love.  
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He claims that ―all are purely human phenomena, or rather, …they belong to that realm of 
reciprocal response which is mediated by the concept of the person, and which is available only 
to beings who possess and are motivated by that concept [i.e. of the person or self].‖105 
Scruton takes a similar position to that of the church and Thomas Aquinas on the role of 
reason in the lives of humans.   He believes that reason distinguishes humans from other animals 
and reason alters the way in which we experience many things that define sexual ethics, such as 
the aforementioned concepts of arousal, desire, and love, all of which are interconnected on his 
view.  He believes  
that we can understand desire only if we first display the outline of a more passive 
state of mind—the state of arousal, in which the body of one person awakens to 
the presence or thought of another.  Arousal provides the underlying circumstance 
of sexual enjoyment, and it contains the seeds of all that is distinctive in the 
sexuality of the rational being.
106
  
 
Indeed, sexual arousal, for Scruton, while focusing on pleasure, is not merely a pleasurable 
physical sensation, it is instead what he calls an ―intentional pleasure‖ that involves ―intentional 
content‖ which focuses not on the physical act, but on ―the meaning of another‘s gesture‖ which 
is ―pleasure directed onto an object‖ not merely ―at or about an object.‖107  Scruton claims that 
the ‗intentional content‘ of arousal (i.e. the thought directed onto another) makes the specific 
object or person about whom the thought is directed essential to sexual arousal.  Arousal itself is 
not a general pleasurable feeling directed out into the ether which can be fulfilled by any object 
or person because, according to Scruton, ―in the normal case of sexual arousal, it would be quite 
extraordinary if the caresses of one party were regarded by the other as the accidental causes of a 
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pleasurable sensation, which might have been caused in some other way.‖ 108 The reason for this, 
argues Scruton, is that ―sexual arousal is a response, but not a response to a stimulus that could 
be fully described merely as the cause of a sensation.  It is a response, at least in part, to a 
thought, where the thought refers to ‗what is going on‘ between myself and another.‖109  This is 
not to say that non-intentional pleasures (i.e. purely physical pleasures at or about an object) are 
not sought in sexual arousal, desire, and the sex act, but rather, non-intentional pleasures are 
secondary to the intentional pleasures in arousal and desire that are awakened about a particular 
person.  In other words, Scruton believes, A is sexually aroused by thoughts of B which have 
intentional content.  Because of the intentional content, A desires to feel non-intentional 
pleasures with B.  C or D would not be able to replace B for A because while C or D could 
perhaps fulfill the non-intentional pleasures just as well as B, they could not fulfill the intentional 
pleasures that arise because they are not B.  Only B will suffice for A because only B is B.  
Because, as Scruton claims, ―arousal is ‗leaning towards‘ the other, a movement in the direction 
of the sexual act, which cannot be separated, wither from the thought upon which it is founded, 
or from the desire to which it leads.‖110  While this may be a specific type of arousal, it does not 
seem to be the only type of arousal.  Indeed some species of arousal, such as in pubescence, 
seem to come not from a particular thought about a particular person, but almost as an instinctual 
function of the body.  Additionally, arousal may be about a specific person, but this does not 
mean that only that person will suffice in a subsequent sexual engagement.  In marital fantasy, 
for instance, one may become aroused by the thought of another, but engages sex for the ‗non-
intentional‘ pleasures with the spouse, not the person or thought that initiated the arousal.  
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Arousal may be initially caused by a thought of another, but there does not seem to be any 
indication that once aroused only the person who caused the initial arousal is sufficient for any 
subsequent sexual interaction.      
Further, Scruton believes arousal also requires an additional component, that of 
reciprocity.  It is not merely enough for an agent to be aroused by another, but the other needs to 
recognize the agent‘s arousal and then become aroused as well because ―arousal is a response to 
the thought of the other, as a self-conscious agent, who is alert to me, and who is able to have 
‗designs‘ on me.‖111 However, this seems extraneous.  A person can become aroused when 
thinking about a person without the person reciprocating or even being present.  Yet, Scruton 
claims this reciprocity is not only a part of arousal, but also a part of desire which ―concentrates 
into itself the whole life of the human being, constituting a direct appeal to the other to recognize 
my embodied existence‖ which is an attempt to ―enlist his participation in a cooperative act.‖112  
This attempt to elicit consent seems to be nothing more than a recognition of an individual‘s 
autonomous right to choose to engage in the act or not.  However, from this point, Scruton 
begins to add what he sees as a ‗normal‘ account of sexual interaction that does not rely on 
consent, though it is a necessary component.  According to Scruton, this act closely mirrors the 
view of Thomas Nagel in which  
we should expect the glance of desire to involve, first, an intention to arouse 
sexual interest; secondly, the intention that this first intention be recognized; 
thirdly, the intention that, through being recognized, it play a part in precipitation 
what is intended.  … In the normal case, the intention is that the other‘s desire be 
reciprocated, not by a recognition of my intention, but by a recognition of my 
desire.
113
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For Nagel, it is the recognition of intention.  Scruton disagrees here and claims that, it is not 
intention but desire that is recognized.  In order to understand the comparison that Scruton makes 
here to Nagel, a brief aside to discuss Nagel‘s article on sexual perversion, is needed because on 
the whole, Nagel‘s view and Scruton‘s are very similar, and it may clarify Scruton‘s position.   
 Nagel claims that when a person experiences sexual attraction toward another, it is for 
more than the qualities or characteristics the person has.  The attraction is brought about because 
of these qualities, but the qualities are not sufficient.  The particular person has the 
characteristics, but it is the person, not the qualities, that is the object of the sexual attraction.  It 
is not the case, according to Nagel, that any person with quality x, y, and z can fulfill the sexual 
desire, it is that particular person.  He claims that while it may be the case that in each situation 
in which a person has quality x, y, and z, sexual attraction or desire will result in the agent; 
however, it is a different and singular attraction toward the person, it is ―not merely a transfer of 
the old desire onto someone else.‖114  This highly individualized and personal nature to sexual 
attraction seems similar to Scruton‘s concept that in order for sex to be natural, it must elicit 
recognition of the ―personal existence of the other.‖115 
Nagel obtains this necessary interpersonal connection of the sexual partners from Sartre 
in Being and Nothingness and indeed Scruton often references this aspect of Sartre.  Nagel 
claims that while Sartre states the purpose of the sexual relationship (i.e. ―the perpetual attempt 
of an embodied consciousness to come to terms with the existence of others‖)116  is always 
unsuccessful, Nagel believes it can in certain circumstances be successful.  Nagel argues that 
sexual desire involves not only awareness of another, but self-awareness, as well as the other 
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being self-aware.  In other words, A must sexually desire B, B must sexually desire A, A must be 
aware that B sexually desires A, B must be aware that A sexually desires B, and both must be 
aware that the other is aware, and this mutual and reciprocal action is what results in a proper 
sexual interaction.  It is not enough for one to be attracted to a person according to Nagel, it must 
involve the awareness of mutual attraction.  This highly complicated system of attraction and 
reciprocity/symmetry is similar to and more clearly stated than the account Scruton provides.  
Nagel further argues that ―desire is therefore not merely the perception of a preexisting 
embodiment of the other, but ideally a contribution to his further embodiment which in turn 
enhances the original subject‘s sense of himself.‖117  However, the key difference, as Scruton 
sees it, is that Nagel focuses on the intention of the act as opposed to the desire of the person.  
For Scruton, the desire is what the other recognizes and to which the other responds and an agent 
does not become desirous because of the other‘s intentions to engage sexually.  For example, if 
A‘s intentions are to have sex with B, B does not become aroused because of those intentions, B 
becomes aroused because A is aroused or desirous.  So, while Nagel gets close to the 
explanation, Scruton feels he misses the mark, partly because Nagel does not introduce love or 
heterosexuality or marriage as Scruton later does.
118
   
Part of Scruton‘s criticism of Nagel stems from Scruton‘s concept of the self and the 
first-person perspective.  These two concepts are essential to Scruton‘s thesis because of both the 
inter-personal aspect of arousal, desire, and sex, but also because of the ‗intentional concepts‘ 
that are a necessary component to his theory.  He claims that the concept of the self and the first-
person perspective stems not only from existence in the world as a distinct entity, but from the 
use of language.  The first-person perspective, while ultimately illusion, according to Scruton, is 
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an important part of how humans understand themselves and others within the world.
119
  
Language and the first-person perspective instills a sense of responsibility toward others who 
exist in the world in much the same way that the agent does because  
There is a practice among self-conscious beings, of reason-giving and reason-
taking, which the agent incorporates into his own conception of what he is and 
does.  He sees himself as one agent among many, answerable for his actions and 
called upon to act for reasons which might also justify his conduct.  He treats 
himself as a person, and demands that others so treat him.
120
 
 
This demand to be treated as a person is a recognition by the agent of his/her individual freedom 
as well as a responsibility to other agents to respect their freedom and also forms the basis for 
morality, both sexual and otherwise.  Thus, in sexual arousal and desire, the other person‘s 
perspective is an integral part of the process.  Because the agent sees him/herself as a person, and 
recognizes similarities in the other and projects this personhood on the other, the other should not 
be viewed as merely an object or body, but as ―the embodiment of another point of view‖ or an 
embodied first-person perspective, in much the same way that the agent understands 
him/herself.
121
  He claims that embodiment is an important aspect of the person; however, it is 
not equivalent to the self.  While the self cannot exist without the body, the body is not the same 
as the self.  It is a part, but not the whole.  Thus, an agent is subject to certain involuntary aspects 
of the body which are an important part of the sexual act.  For example, erection, the ―softening 
of the vagina,‖ blushing, and laughing are involuntary and it is this involuntariness in which the 
body ―reasserts its natural rights as a person,‖ by ―ceas[ing]… to be an instrument.‖122  However, 
one of the roles of reason, for Scruton, is to reign in and control the involuntary aspect of 
embodiment, and it is thorough this exertion of control that the foundation of morals are 
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formed.
123
  Thus far, the introduction of an individual‘s first person perspective does little else 
than provide a platform for morality which seems to depend upon a person‘s responsibility 
toward and recognition of other agents as autonomous beings. 
 However, in sexual desire, it is one of the rare instances in which the other‘s embodiment 
is that in which we are interested and the involuntary aspects of the body are a primary focus, 
claims Scruton.
124
  Sexual desire, in its proper or ‗normal‘ form is always about a human being.  
However, as stated, it is  
not just human flesh, but also the first-person perspective which serves to 
individualise him in his own eyes and in the eyes of his pursuer.  To put it another 
way…sexual desire is interested in the embodiment of the other, and not in his 
body.  The interpersonal intentionality lies therefore in desire itself.
125
    
 
Interestingly though, Scruton argues that while the critical intentionalising component recognizes 
on the other as a person, the sex organs and the body in general are the primary focus of sexual 
desire.  In fact, when one desires another, they desire that person ―as a man, or as a woman. 
…and [agents] approach the other partly as a representative of his [or her] sex.‖126  This seems to 
counter his argument that arousal and desire focus on that particular person and cannot be 
replaced by just any other of the same kind.  However, he quickly qualifies his statement and, 
along the lines of Thomas Nagel, states that while the other represents a specific kind, i.e. male 
or female, with specific traits, i.e. body type, hair color, etc., and these things are those that 
initially bring about arousal and desire,  it is a second part of desire, the intentionalising thought 
that refutes this.  Indeed, Scruton claims,  
In the very first moment of desire there is … a paradox: the body of the other is 
interesting because it is one instance of a bodily kind; but the very interest which 
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focuses upon it insists that it is no such thing, that it is unique, irreplaceable, the 
one and only object of this present emotion.  This is yet another aspect of the 
tension that is present in our intentional understanding of embodiment.
127
 
 
Here Scruton attempts to incorporate his idea of intentionality into sexual desire ad hoc.  He 
admits that the primary focus of sexual desire is the body, but then claims that the mind 
somehow rationalizes that the body is not what is wanted, but the unique, irreplaceable 
individual.  In fact, when attempting to clarify what happens, he claims that the typical ―randy 
sailor‖ who comes ashore after being at sea and desires to have sex with a woman, and any 
woman will seem to do, does not actually desire a woman at all, but is simply ―desiring to 
desire.‖  He claims that what is going on with the sailor ―seriously misrepresents the transition 
that occurs when the woman is found and he is set on the path of satisfaction.‖128  Because once 
he finds the specific woman who is to satisfy his sexual desire, he has ―found the woman whom 
he wants, whom he seeks to arouse and upon whom his thoughts and energies are focused.‖129  
However, this seems to move contrary to Scruton‘s theory.  He claims that sexual desire and 
sexual arousal occur properly only when the intentionalising thoughts focus on a particular 
person, yet here there is the desire that occurs, and then the partner is found, and then the 
individualizing happens.  So, it seems that in most sexual acts, even prostitution, if this example 
can be relied upon, the other person can still be seen as a unique individual and not merely one of 
a kind.  There does not seem to be a grave distinction between a stranger and a well-known lover 
within the intentionalising thoughts; it merely seems to be the mind rationalizing its sexual 
desire.  And thus far, on Scruton‘s model, it seems as though promiscuous sex is acceptable, if 
not prostitution.  Prostitution may still be problematic for Scruton because there may not be 
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reciprocal desire.  However, his requirement of reciprocal desire, while ideal, does not seem 
necessary or essential to sexual intercourse.  One can easily imagine a scenario in which an agent 
is sexually aroused by the thought of his/her spouse, sexually desires his/her spouse, and engages 
in sexual intercourse with the willing and consenting spouse even though the spouse does not 
sexually desire him/her.         
 It is not until Scruton discusses what he sees to be the end result of sexual desire that one 
gains an understanding of that to which his thesis is aiming.  Many people assume that the aim or 
end purpose of the sex act is orgasm or sexual pleasure or, as previously discussed, reproduction.  
However, Scruton believes that this is not the case; it is something much more interpersonal.  He 
claims that the aim of sexual desire is the ―‗union‘ with the other‖ which involves intimacy, and 
a desire ―to aim one‘s words, caresses and glances,… into the heart of the other, and to know 
him from the inside, as a creature who is part of oneself. … intimacy tend[s] to love—to a sense 
of commitment founded on the mutuality of desire.‖130  This union, however, seems to present a 
paradox because, as many a philosopher have pointed out, it is impossible to achieve a union 
with another embodied self in the sense in which Scruton seems to be intimating.  Additionally, 
he assumes that this particular view of sex is a ‗norm‘ or what occurs between most people and 
there is really no evidence to suggest this.  Nevertheless, he claims that ―the aim of desire is first 
to incarnate the first-person perspective (the for-itself) of the other; and secondly to unite with it 
as flesh.‖131  He looks to Sartre for an explanation here, just as Nagel did in his article.  The 
concepts of sexual glances, blushes, and other involuntary actions of the body that Scruton 
claims allow for the body to take back control as the person, is ultimately captured in the sexual 
caresses that occur between the two agents.  For Sartre, this caress is an attempt to ―incarnate‖ 
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the self in the body, what Scruton describes as ―summon[ing] your [i.e. the other‘s] 
consciousness (your ‗for-itself‘) into your flesh, so as to be able to posses you there.‖132  
However, Scruton takes issue with the common interpretation of possession in this sexual sense.  
It typically invokes the idea of ‗ownership,‘ what feminist Carole Pateman (among others) calls 
―male sex right‖ which will be discussed in the subsequent section.  This idea of possession of 
another‘s freedom or ownership of the other, is dismissed by Scruton and he introduces another 
concept of freedom which allows him to introduce an alternate interpretation of the ‗union‘ 
between the two agents that occurs in the sex act and serves as the aim of sexual desire.  By 
freedom, Scruton merely discusses a ‗metaphor‘ in which one acknowledges one‘s responsibility 
toward one‘s future actions.  He claims that humans are free insofar as they recognize the 
necessity of reasons for actions and take responsibility for these reason-based actions.  So, when 
one wishes to ‗take possession‘ of another, or ‗unite‘ with another sexually, it merely implies 
that the agent attempts to ―[solicit] another‘s consent to [the agent‘s] desire for [him/her]…. [and 
thus] the concept of freedom remains metaphysically innocent.‖133  The flow of this argument, in 
a sense, seems to be drifting toward a theory of autonomy and consent.  The individual 
recognizes and respects the other‘s autonomy and elicits consent in respect of that autonomy.  
However, while consent and ‗freedom‘ are necessary in Scruton‘s understanding of the first 
person perspective, he takes a much different turn in relation to sexual interaction.   
Scruton eventually gets to his primary moral evaluation of sex when he asks the question, ―what 
place has sexual desire in love, friendship and esteem?‖134  The answer to which, he believes, 
will provide a moral basis for sexual behavior in humans which is distinct from general moral 
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theories of autonomy.   In his analysis of love, he admits that love and desire have separable aims 
and that  
love seeks companionship, in which mutual well-being will be the common 
purpose; it is nourished on counsels and conversations, on gifts and tokens, on 
affection, loyalty, and esteem.  Moreover, love involves dependence.  It is not a 
commodity that can be received, now from this provider, now from that.  To love 
is to acquire the need for another individual, and to wish for one‘s solace there, 
with him.
135
   
 
This separability, however, does not mean that love and desire are not related to one another, in 
fact, Scruton argues, desire can be and often is an expression of love.  And for Scruton, the 
intentional structure of sexual desire modifies love in such a way as to necessitate love within the 
bounds of sexual morality.
136
   
Erotic love, which differs from the love that grows from esteem or friendship, is based 
not upon reason or the virtues found in the other (as is the case in the friendship of esteem), but 
rather it is reason-involving.  Scruton claims that ―erotic love, which focuses on the embodiment 
of the other, is … not a rational response, even if it is a response which only rational beings may 
experience.‖137  In erotic love, one is not forced to judge the continuity or virtue of the other in 
quite so harsh a manner as a friend would.  Erotic love is able to ―survive the awareness of 
another‘s depravity‖ and faults without disintegrating as friendship would under the same 
conditions.  In the true friendship of esteem, the agent comes to expect an excellence and 
continuity of behavior from the friend, whereas inconsistency and dependence or depravity is 
forgiven or endeared in erotic love.  This forgiveness and enjoyment in the flawed nature of the 
other that is a part of erotic love seems to ―defy the demands of reason.‖138  According to 
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Scruton, love ―moralises‖ the other or attempts to conform the other to an ideal, even if the other 
has not lived up to the ideal and he believes that when the other blatantly fails to fulfill the ideal, 
the agent simply rewrites the definition of the ideal, so that the other continues to conform.  This 
is what he means when he says love is ―reason-involving‖ but not based in reason.  And when 
this reason-involving aspect of love comes into contact with desire, there is a moralizing that 
occurs within desire itself.
139
  However, this seems to go too far.  Scruton claims that love is 
what moralizes desire; however, this goes against his earlier idea that what brings morality into 
sexuality are the first person perspective and a recognition of such a perspective in another.  The 
idea of the first-person perspective seems acceptable and applies to all interactions between 
people, both sexual and nonsexual; however, the addition of love at this point is entirely 
extraneous to the morality of sex.  Instead, what this addition does is add an ideal form of sex to 
which a person can strive.  However, at this point he fails to provide an adequate argument for 
the necessity of love in sexual interactions as the foundation of sexual ethics.   
 This moral transformation of love and desire, he claims, stems from self-esteem, which 
―requires you to love, so that, while being overcome by the other, you can believe yourself to 
have preserved your inner freedom.‖  In fact, ―desire does not imply love; but it provides a 
motive to love—and this fact is crucial in understanding the intentionality of desire‖140 which 
attempts to preserve one‘s own self-esteem.  However, it is not clear why desire and partaking in 
sexual intercourse represent a danger to one‘s self esteem as Scruton believes.  Because Scruton 
believes the agent‘s self-esteem is at stake in sexual desire and erotic love, he claims that it 
always involves the desire for the other‘s well being, because in maintaining the well-being of 
the other, the agent is able to maintain his/her own well-being.  This does not seem to follow.  
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Nevertheless, Scruton states this maintenance of well-being, in part, is the fulfillment of sexual 
desire because  
in delineating the fulfillment of a state of mind, one is recommending a long-term 
project, which will resolve the tensions, and fulfill the ancillary wishes and needs, 
that arise in the expression of the basic intentional structure. … Erotic love 
provides the lover with the justification of this desire, and, if reciprocated, with 
the inner peace that rewards the trouble of desire.
141
            
 
While he does not explain why desire needs to be justified, Scruton claims that the final purpose 
or function of desire, when considered normatively, is ultimately an intentional outlook that 
seeks mutual dependence and reciprocity with another in erotic love.  Thus erotic love and the 
concern for the other‘s well-being naturally or normally, and in fact for Scruton, morally, 
develops into ―nuptuality‖ or marriage.  Marriage is an ultimate result or aim of sexual desire 
because ―human love involves an inevitable tendency to seek out and be with the other, to 
involve one‘s destiny completely and inseparably with his.  Love seeks, not a promise of 
affection, but a vow of loyalty.‖142  This vow, ultimately of marriage, is a much stronger 
commitment than a promise and results in a ―complete surrendering of one‘s future to a present 
project[,] … which is a hidden vector within the intentionality of love.‖143  However, while it 
may be the case that human love evolves in this manner, it is not love but sex that is the issue 
here and while love may be ideal in sexual relationships, the argument Scruton outlines does not 
indicate that it is the only morally permissible type.    
 So, to briefly summarize Scruton‘s sexual view thus far, he believes that sexual arousal 
contains an intentionalising aspect that is then expressed through sexual desire.  Sexual desire 
focuses on the body and embodiment of the other.  The body alone is not what the agent really 
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desires in sexual desire, but rather the embodied point of view of the other, which is unique and 
irreplaceable.  The agent sees him/herself as having a first-person perspective, or self, and 
attributes the same to the other.  Because of this, the agent desires to unite with the other‘s 
unique first-person point of view and desires that the other desire the same.  This mutuality is 
expressed in erotic love which focuses on the mutuality and dependence of the other, which 
ultimately results in a vow of marriage.  Thus, only those sexual acts which involve love and 
marriage are morally acceptable in his view.         
 All of this discussion on sexual desire and love, as Scruton admits, is based on a concept 
of normality.
144
  When one fulfills the function or aim of desire and love that Scruton describes, 
one acts in a morally appropriate manner, when one does not, he claims, it is a sexual perversion, 
which intends the same condemnatory attitude that was discussed previously in the section on 
naturalistic theories.  Any act of sex that does not fit Scruton‘s model, he believes is morally 
impermissible.  Prostitution, on this model would be clearly impermissible because it does not 
involve love or marriage and, Scruton would argue, reciprocity and intentionalizing thoughts.  
However, the biggest problem with Scruton‘s theory is the same problem that naturalistic 
theories encounter, namely that that which is not normal is morally impermissible.  He fails to 
provide the link between love and moral permissibility. He merely makes the claim that love is 
what makes sex morally acceptable. 
However, his key complaint of sex without love is the intention of the agent to divorce 
the interpersonal nature of the act from the bodily aspect.
145
  The perverted agent wishes only to 
experience the bodily aspect and cares nothing for the agency of the other.  This sounds very 
much like the Kantian criticism that the agent is failing to treat the other as an end but merely as 
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a means.  Part of this criticism stems from Scruton‘s belief in the intentional structure of desire.  
If the agent intends to perform a sexual act without the goal of union in mind (which remember, 
for Scruton entails a vow), then the act is perverted.  To quote at length, Scruton believes, 
The complete or partial failure to recognize, in and through desire, the personal 
existence of the other is therefore an affront, both to him and to oneself.  
Moreover, in so divorcing sexual conduct from the impulse of accountability and 
care, we remove from the sphere of personal relations the major force which 
compels us to unite with others, to accept them and to compromise our lives on 
their account.  In other words, we remove what is deepest in ourselves—our 
life—from our moral commerce, and set it apart, in a realm that is free from the 
sovereignty of moral law, a realm of curious pleasure, in which the body is both 
sovereign and obscene.
146
 
 
However, accountability and care for the other as an agent need not be divorced from sexual 
interactions without love.  Love is not the only way to care for another and a person can still 
respect the fact that the other is an individual with rights and goals without removing morality 
from the interaction.  Additionally, pleasure in another‘s company is a form of care and pleasure 
in general is often a motivation for ‗uniting‘ with another.   
So, many acts, including prostitution, are categorized as immoral.  This is a mistake 
because while the sex may not be linked with love or viewing the person as ―the particular, 
unique person he or she is‖ neither is the person ―reduced to something less that a person, and 
banished beyond the pale of moral concern.‖147  While prostitution may be impersonal, in the 
sense that the two agents may be strangers, this does not mean that it is necessarily immoral on 
those grounds.  The link to perversion or immorality does not seem valid because in prostitution 
it does not seem to be a failure to treat one as a person or even in every case to divorce the 
personal from the animal.  While admittedly, the often anonymous and physical aspect of 
prostitution tends to lead to a divorce of the animal and the personal, there can still be an 
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interpersonal recognition of the individuality and desires of the other.  This initial recognition is 
very similar to the earlier discussed example that Scruton provides of the randy sailor.  Why is it 
not the same as that sailor that once the john finds a prostitute, the desire is not a general desire, 
but is rationalized into desire about that particular woman, and likewise, once the prostitute 
accepts the john as a client, why is it that the interaction makes it as though she does not 
recognize him/her as an individual?  While the desire for a union in marriage and dependence 
does not typically figure into the affair, Scruton claims it is the intentions of the agents that 
determine the perversion, not the act itself.  Indeed it seems as though Scruton had difficulty with 
prostitution, because instead of discussing prostitution in the chapter on sexual perversion as he 
did with homosexuality, bestiality, etc, he discusses it in an earlier chapter where he discusses 
the obscene in sexual phenomenon.  However, he comes to the same conclusion that the 
prostitute ―divorced the sexual act from its project of sexual union.‖148  He claims that because 
the prostitute presents herself as a commodity, she is thus interchangeable and there cannot be 
the reciprocity that is necessary.  However, reciprocity and indeed marriage and love seem 
unnecessary additions to the sexual act that seem to represent an ideal form of sexual interactions 
rather that a ‗norm‘ of these interactions.  He fails, just as the Thomistic theory, to account for 
multiple purposes or functions of sexual interactions.  It seems rather that Scruton bases his 
claims on a legitimate moral ground when he states that the first-person perspective and a 
recognition of this in others is what provides a basis for morality in sex.  Further, this 
understanding of the first-person perspective merely seems like a theory of autonomy that 
requires consent to participation.  However, from this idea Scruton begins to add additional and 
extraneous criteria to sexual ethics and an understanding of sex that do not seem to have any 
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basis.  He claims that in prostitution, there is a transactionary aspect which ―frees the woman 
from every moral tie with her client.‖149  However, the prostitute still has a first person 
perspective and recognizes this in the other and thus still has a moral tie to the client, even if it is 
to merely respect the terms of the contract.  While Scruton believes that all sexual acts outside of 
love and marriage are immoral because of the connections he makes between love, desire, 
arousal, and marriage, those connections seem to be highly conjectured and based on many 
controversial and debatable ideas.  
Radical Feminist Ethics of Sexuality 
 
While much of feminist philosophical study on sexual morality centers on what is viewed 
as an improper, or perhaps unnatural, relationship among men and women.  In the United States, 
as well as around the world, feminist philosophy, in general, concentrates on the inequalities and 
subjugation that women as a group face in society.  This subjugation, oppression, or inequality is 
typically attributed to the historically-based, male-dominated patriarchy that feminists argue is 
still quite active today.  While most feminist tend to agree with this assessment of society, the 
ethical views that they hold towards sex and sexuality tend to vary quite widely.   
Some feminist take a liberal stance toward sex and claim that only by reclaiming female 
sexuality and sexual practices can women liberate themselves from the oppressive male-
dominated sexual structure.  While this view is often criticized for endorsing and supporting 
promiscuous sex, what the proponents are attempting to do is to view sexuality and sex in much 
the same way that males do.  It is an attempt, among other things to dissolve the double standard 
in sex that condemns women for liberal sexual practices that have been practiced by and 
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accepted about men throughout history.  This view will be discussed somewhat in the subsequent 
chapter in the context of consent and liberal sexual ethics.   
The other common feminist view towards sexual ethics is often referred to as the ‗radical 
feminist view.‘ This view, typically espoused in reference to pornography by Catherine 
McKinnon and Andrea Dworkin among others, and in relation to prostitution and other women‘s 
issues by Carole Pateman, takes the general feminist perspective on the status of women in 
today‘s society and applies it to the discussion of sexual practices, and the widely held 
prejudicial role of women in such domains, and concludes that all heterosexual sexual 
experiences and acts of sex are a form of oppression by men over women and are thus immoral 
on those grounds.  Many of these radical feminists go so far as to claim women, because of their 
societal position, are unable to give proper consent to such practices and thus all sex acts are 
rape.  While this position is extreme and tends to inflame the opposition, it is successful in its use 
of rhetoric to point out the feminist argument and position on the need for women‘s improved 
position in society.  However, while that is a version of the feminist position, this analysis will 
focus more on the feminist view of sexual morals and the attempt to improve women‘s place in 
society by revising the sexual code.  The subsequent analysis of radical feminist sexual ethics 
and prostitution will be discussed primarily using the philosophy and theory of Carole Pateman 
who argues that   prostitution, then, is ―morally undesirable,‖ because ―it is one of the most 
graphic examples of men‘s domination over women.‖150 And thus, represents an institution that 
diverges from the feminist goal of equality for women.   
Pateman argues that feminists typically analyze the relationship between men and women 
in relation to power rather than sex, however, in contemporary society, it is impossible to 
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separate the power one has from his/her sexual identity and life.  She claims that ―the expression 
of sexuality and what it means to be feminine and a woman, or masculine and a man, is 
developed within, and inextricably bound up with, relations of dominance and subordination.‖151  
Much of Pateman‘s argument can be found in her text, The Sexual Contract, and is a criticism of 
the popular (though varied) social contract view (recently typified by Rawls‘ Theory of Justice) 
which, to put it simply, argues that society is formed based on a social contract in which 
individuals who are naturally free and equal decide to become a group which ―exchange the 
insecurities of natural freedom for equal, civil freedom which is protected by the state.‖152  
Subsequently, with the equal freedom shared by the adults within the state, any agreement that is 
made between two people represents or mimics this original social contract between them.  So, if 
two parties engage in a negotiation for goods, services, or even marriage, it is based on a mutual 
understanding of a contract being forged for their mutual benefit.  Many of these theories 
incorporate theories of consent and coercion (the primary topic of chapter three) that determine 
valid and invalid contracts, however, Pateman argues that all social contract theory is inherently 
flawed because they neglect an aspect of contract theory that predates the social contract, namely 
the sexual contract.
153
   
All contract theories attempt to explain how society established a ―political right‖ 
founded on ―free social relations [that] take a contractual form,‖ however, even before this was 
established, men and women were involved in a ‗sexual contract‘ that ―is also about the genesis 
of a political right, and explains why exercise of the right is legitimate—but this story is about 
political right as patriarchal right or sex-right, the power that men exercise over women.  The 
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missing half of the story [i.e. the sexual contract] tells how a specifically modern form of 
patriarchy is established.‖154  For Pateman, the sexual contract is a contract that essentially 
establishes male dominion over females, specifically allowing men to have equal access to 
intercourse with females.  Pateman claims that while ―the social contract is a story of freedom; 
the sexual contract is a story of subjugation.‖155  The sexual contract is established even before 
the social contract because before the patriarchal structure of social contract was established, 
there was patriarchal control of familial units based on the male-sex right in which men (later 
husbands and fathers) controlled women (wives and mothers).   
However, when Pateman uses the term sexual contract, it does not really seem like a 
contract at all.  A contract presupposes a mutually beneficial agreement that both parties agree 
to, whereas what she describes as the sexual contract is merely man dominating women.  It 
seems as though the control that men possessed over women and the family were never 
contractual but merely taken, in which case she is mistaken in using the term.  However, if there 
truly was a sexual contract in which women exchanged sex or some form of submission for 
protection or some other benefit in pre-societal situations, then what she is claiming with the 
sexual contract is not a taking of such dominance and  forced submission as such but what was a 
mutually beneficial contract.  She seems to equate the sexual contract with the concept of male-
sex right which grants all men access to all women‘s bodies.  If it truly was a contract then it 
would not be equal to all men gaining access to all women‘s bodies, but a specific man gaining 
access to a specific woman based on this sexual contract.  There does not seem to be a link from 
an individual or common practice to a universal right.  If, on the other hand, there was not a 
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contract but women were truly dominated by men and forced to submit, there was not a contract 
at all, as she claims.  She seems to equate two concepts that do not seem consistent. 
Nevertheless, she claims that when the original contracts were formed, patriarchal sex-
right over women was already in place and was incorporated into the social contract intact 
because this relationship between men and women was seen as representative of the ‗private 
sphere‘ which was politically unimportant.  The equality of freedom was only granted to men 
who were involved as free agents in the politically significant ‗public sphere‘ in which women 
were denied equal access because of their subordinate position in the familial private sphere.
156
  
However, to claim, as many social contract theorists do, that patriarchy has no bearing on the 
public, political sphere is, according to Pateman, disingenuous because ―patriarchal right extends 
throughout civil society.‖157  When contract theorists claim that they do not discuss the private 
sphere because it has no bearing on the political world and civil society, they are ignoring gender 
roles that are created in response to patriarchy, civil society, and male sex-right.  The differences 
are relevant to incorporating women into the discussion of the original contract because ―the two 
spheres of civil society are at once separate and inseparable.  The public realm cannot be fully 
understood in the absence of the private sphere, and, similarly, the meaning of the original 
contract is misinterpreted without both, mutually dependant, halves of the story.‖158  An 
understanding not only of the sexual contract, but that there is a sexual contract is essential to 
understanding the problems that Pateman and other radical feminist believe arise from contracts 
that involve women.  When these contract theories are discussed, few theorists discuss gender or 
if they do, they have antiquated ideas of what it means to be a man and what it means to be a 
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woman.  When these ideas are incorporated into the theories, the conclusions generally equate 
capacities and tendencies to men and woman separately and men tend to come out ahead in the 
analysis.  Men, according to Pateman, were the only ones who were granted ―ownership of 
property in the person; only men, that is to say, are ‗individuals.‘…the classic theorists claim that 
women naturally lack the attributes and capacities of ‗individuals.‘‖159  This conclusion led to 
women being shunned from political life and thus, were denied freedom as an individual and 
instead relegated to the home and hearth as a subordinate of man through the marriage contract, 
which is seen as a part of the ‗natural condition‘ that existed before the original contract.160  And 
while Pateman admits that in today‘s society, the marriage contract and the idea of woman as 
property has been reformulated to some degree, she believes that the lives of women and wives, 
while often entering into the public sphere, never do so as equals.  Women as a group, she 
argues, are always subordinate to men as a group or fraternity.  Because women are members of 
an oppressed and dominated group, the contracts in which they engage are always established 
under unequal and disadvantageous conditions.  This generalization is very problematic.  What 
Pateman is arguing is that ―all women must be the victims of gender inequality.  They must be so 
whatever other social factors operate to determine their particular identity.  They must be such 
victims whatever their own experiences.‖161  Pateman‘s claim seems unfounded when 
universalized.  Nevertheless, the contracts that Pateman analyses are specifically employment 
contracts and what she calls the prostitution contract.
162
 
In employment and prostitution (a type of employment), women and men enter into 
contracts with employers.  However, while it may sometimes (though seldom), according to 
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Pateman, be the case with men, when women enter into contracts, the theorists and even society 
today, often ignore the ―grossly unequal position of the relevant parties and to the economic and 
other constraints facing workers, wives and women in general.‖163  Now that women take a 
regular and active part in the political and public sphere, the language of sexual difference, i.e. 
what it means to be a man or a woman, is often utilized to reinforce the idea that men and 
women have natural differences that explain away the inequalities that are inherent in civil 
society, most specifically the contracts formed with women.
164
  This emphasis, she believes, 
stems from the sexual contract which ―is about (hetero)sexual relations and women as embodied 
sexual beings.‖165  This sexual relationship between men and women is a relationship of power; 
men have power over women that enable them to then have ―sexual access to women‘s bodies 
and claim right of command over the use of women‘s bodies.‖166  And this, she claims is not 
merely within the private realm of the home, but is present in civil society in the form of 
prostitution, which she sees as the demand by men to have sexual access to women who are not 
their wives, but are rather, a commodity to be bought.  Similarly, in any employment contract 
with women, men will always have the upper hand in the interaction. 
This power differential is, in modern social contract theory, explained away when 
theorists claim that the contracts are formed by individuals which are gender or sexually neutral.  
They claim that since all individuals are naturally free and equal, and since individuals have 
property in themselves, this property needs to be protected against infringement by others, and 
thus, no other can use this property in the self without the individual‘s express permission.  This 
however, does not mean that the individual cannot ―allow the use of his property by another, or 
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rent it out or sell it … if it is to his advantage.‖167  All contracts involve this type of exchange in 
property.  However, as Pateman argues, when women or workers enter into any type of 
exchange, it is not as equals.  Simply because the theoretical original position or the original 
contract was made between free and equal individuals, does not mean all individuals today are 
free and equal.  The sexual contract makes women unequal and economic necessity makes many 
workers unequal, resulting in an agreement to a contract that is not mutually beneficial, but 
unfair and asymmetrical.  Because of this inequality and asymmetry, it is not a contract of 
exchange even though there is exchange present in the contract, but rather a contract of 
subordination and domination.  It is the one with power, the dominant man, making a contract 
with someone without power, subordinate women or workers.
168
  For this reason, contracts 
between women and men are always coercive.  The woman has no choice but to comply.  
Interestingly, this applies to all women and all men for Pateman.  Since all men, according to 
Pateman, even those with limited power among men, have more power than even the most 
powerful of women (which does not seem very accurate), women and men can never enter into a 
free contract, it is always coercive.
169
  This is problematic when one considers women 
negotiating with men or even when a woman is the employer offering a job to a man.  Even if an 
individual woman does not believe herself to be dominated by a man, she is nonetheless, because 
she belongs to a group that is subordinate.  This idea does not seem to stand up to scrutiny and is 
a universal claim that does not represent reality.  Even if it is the case that most women are 
subordinate to most men, does not allow for the universalization of the claim. 
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This generalization, though, stems from the view that women are property not of 
themselves but of men.  Thus, the idea that the marriage contract was based on the transference 
of ownership from father to husband (while not the standard view today, many feminist argue 
that it is indeed still the case, despite feminist efforts to reform marriage laws).  In a sense, 
Pateman argues, following Gerder Lerner‘s hypothesis, that women were the first slaves of men.  
This slavery stems from the  
idea that individuals or categories of human beings could be permanently 
subjugated… women were already subordinated to the men of their social groups.  
Men must have observed that women easily became socially marginal if they 
were deprived of the protection of their kinsman or were no longer required for 
sexual use… they also developed the means to make such separation into 
permanent slavery.
170
                   
 
This hypothesis put forward seems to assume much about women and men.  It does not allow for 
the differences between women of different societies throughout history that Pateman previously 
admitted existed.  Not all women were and are treated this way in all societies.  Nevertheless, she 
argues that this type of slavery seems ―to stand at the opposite pole from the wage labourer.‖171  
The slave, whether man or woman, is forced into labor and made property.  The wage laborer on 
the other hand, is ―judicially free and a civil equal; he voluntarily enters into an employment 
contract and in exchange he receives a wage.‖172   
However, as Pateman argued earlier, the exchange is not the primary feature of contracts, 
power is, and in this sense, while contracts are not exactly the same as slavery, they are also not 
so far off.  Much of the arguments that were espoused in previous centuries and decades relied 
upon the idea that women lacked the capacity to enter into a contract, to be a wage laborer, to do 
anything on her own because of her feebleness in both mind and body.  However, 17
th
, 18
th
, and 
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19
th
 century scholars, men and women, argued that strength was not a sufficient criteria, and ―the 
argument from strength, though it can still be heard today, has become more and more 
implausible‖173 and the intellectual arguments were shown to be more a matter of sufficient 
education than natural capacities.  However, the entrance of women into the public sphere can 
only be understood, for Pateman, by analyzing the similarities and differences between the 
marriage contract and the employment contract.      
In a sense, the marriage contract ―is a kind of labour contract.  To become a wife entails 
becoming a housewife; that is, a wife is someone who works for her husband in the marital 
home.‖174 However, to compare wives and workers and the marriage contract with the 
employment contract is ―to forget the sexual contract once again.‖  The worker was created and 
only able to be a worker, originally, if there was a marriage contract in which a wife was able to 
take care of the home and needs of the husband.  Before the worker, there was the man at home 
working domestically to provide for the family.  The worker, who works for another in the public 
sphere, is strictly masculine, according to Pateman because even women who work outside of the 
home do not do so in the same way that men do because there is not the other at home who takes 
care of the daily needs of the women, she does both the house work and the outside work.
175
  She 
ignores cases in which women are the workers and men stay in the home.  Pateman argues, as 
many do, that ―even as workers, women are subordinated to men in a different way than men are 
subordinated to other men.  Women have not been incorporated into the patriarchal structure of 
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capitalist employment as ‗workers‘; they have been incorporated as women; and how can it be 
otherwise when women are not, and cannot, be men?‖176   
In addition to this, workers lack an aspect of work for which housewives are responsible.  
Not only were women responsible for house work, they were also responsible for conjugal 
duties, which the husband was legally permitted to demand whenever he chose.  This conjugal 
‗right‘ was a common reason for believing that wives could not be victims of rape by their 
husbands, which was not revised in the law until the late 20
th
 century.
177
  Because of what 
Pateman seems as a ‗natural‘ link of sex, sexuality, and male-sex right that is a part not only of 
marriage, but civil society, she believes, that the sex act and sexuality is inextricably linked to 
the concept of the self for women.  She argues that humans are sexual beings and while this may 
be a social construction, it is ingrained in the lives of men and women.  Men and women are not 
truly gender neutral individuals, and cannot be, because even men and women do not see 
themselves in this manner. The patriarchal society in which humans live create a self-identity 
that links sex and gender to humans, so that when one engages in the sex act, one is unable to 
remove the gender or sex of the self from the act.  This inextricable link between the self and sex 
and its relation to power is part of Pateman‘s criticism of the prostitution contract.  She believes 
that any act of prostitution inherently harms the prostitute because of the dominant role of the 
male and submissive role of the female.  
Part of many contemporary contract theorists‘ views of prostitution and women in the 
workplace incorporate a view of ‗labor power‘ or services rendered in which it is not a person or 
a body or a self that is contracted out, but rather the services or labor which that individual can 
provide in exchange for money.  This ‗services rendered‘ concept which contract theorists use is 
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an explanation for how contracts qualify as a free exchange.  This, however, for Pateman, is a 
faulty understanding of what is actually happening in the capitalist labor system in general, as 
well as in the case of prostitution.  The contract theorists‘ argument is that only services are 
rendered by the owner (individual) of his/her property (body) and nothing else.  However, 
Pateman does not believe that this can be the case in prostitution, an exchange of sex for money, 
if the identity of the self is inseparable from the sexuality of the individual.
178
  Pateman argues 
that there is much more than services that are exchanged in the capitalist system, especially in 
the case of the prostitution contract.  The physical body and the self are exchanged as well 
because ―labour power, capacities or services, cannot be separated from the person of the worker 
like pieces of property.  The worker‘s capacities are developed over time and they form an 
integral part of his self and self-identity; capacities are internally not externally related to the 
person.‖179  Thus, for Pateman, labor power as property is a fiction that cannot be separated from 
the individual ―owner‖ and therefore, the command and use of the individual self and body is 
what is being contracted out in employment.
180
  While it may be the case that the self cannot be 
separated from the act, there is no reason to claim, as Pateman does that the self is being 
contracted out as such, but merely the use of it.  The use of a body and self is not the same as 
ownership or alienation of the self as Pateman seems to suggest. 
For Pateman, prostitution, however, is not merely another occupation that can be 
understood in contractarian terms, nor is it a free exchange between two individuals.  Prostitution 
is another way in which men exercise the sexual contract.  The reason that prostitution is 
included in the sexual contract is because the acceptance of a broader sexual status in 
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contemporary times allows for men to have access to women‘s bodies in a variety of ways 
outside of marriage.  While marriage was the previously accepted institution in which men could 
control women, prostitution and the wider (though not universal) acceptance of promiscuous sex 
has enabled men to engage in sex with women without the marital obligations of protection or 
dependence entailed in the marriage contract.
181
  However, ―prostitution is seen as a private 
enterprise, and the contract between client and prostitute is seen as a private arrangement 
between buyer and seller.‖182  Prostitution, as understood by Pateman and many others, is viewed 
as the selling of ―the body‖ for money.  However, many defenders of prostitution claim that it is 
not the body that is sold, but sexual services.  And women should be seen as merely another 
worker, so that there is nothing inherently wrong with prostitution that is not also wrong with 
any other paid labor.  It is merely another version of the employment contract.
183
  This argument 
is insufficient for Pateman because she believes, as previously stated that one cannot divorce 
services from the self or body.  When someone buys services, they buy the command and use of 
the body.  Since prostitution deals exclusively with sexuality and the sexual self is unable to be 
divorced from the sex acts, prostitution is inherently harmful for the women who engage in it 
because it is a constant submission which is unhealthy and detrimental to the wellbeing of the 
individual.  Further, not only is prostitution harmful for the prostitutes, it is harmful for women 
in general as a group, because it allows for the commoditization of sex, which translates into 
male-sex right and the subjugation of women all over again.   
However, one problem with Pateman‘s account is that it does not grant the same status to 
homosexual male prostitution as heterosexual women.  She claims that the purpose of a man in 
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engaging in female prostitution is to display his dominance and right to a woman‘s body.  Since 
male homosexuals are not women, it does not have the same significance.  While Pateman does 
claim that female prostitution is a version of the sexual contract, it seems that a similar display of 
dominance, on Pateman‘s account, occurs with male-male homosexual sex.  It is a contract in the 
same sense and in which one man demands the sex-right, only it happens to be a man and not a 
woman.  Likewise, lesbian prostitution would not be an issue for Pateman either.  Pateman seems 
too quick to dismiss this phenomenon as ―not having the same social meaning.‖184   
Additionally, Pateman makes the claim that the sex act itself, distinguishes prostitution 
from other occupations because of the intimate nature of the act which cannot be separated.  She 
places a very significant amount of attention and importance to the physical act, when the body 
and the self are not equivalent.  She claims however, that the psychological harm caused by 
prostitution and the subordination in the act are long lasting and cannot be an insignificant part of 
the occupation.  Prostitution, then, is assumed to represent a submission of women.  Yet, in 
sexual interactions, women do not have to be submissive.  However, what Pateman and many 
other feminists tend to do is ignore scores and scores of testimony by prostitutes that prostitution 
is preferable, enjoyable, and not as detrimental to the self as many claim.  While there is also 
testimony that by prostitutes that prostitution is an extremely harmful practice that is bad for 
women, the other testimonies in favor of prostitution cannot be ignored.   
Similarly, the universal claims that Pateman tends to make about women in the workforce 
being subordinate to all men as a group (which does not necessarily translate into real life), is 
carried on in the prostitution contract.  She does not seem to have the same reaction to male 
homosexual prostitution as female heterosexual prostitution, which does not necessarily mean 
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that prostitution is immoral or wrong, only that the male-female sexual relationship is inherently 
flawed and needs to be changed.  However, she claims that even if the sexual relationships are 
changed (though she does not outline how) prostitution would still be wrong and degrading to 
women and would likely not occur if the sexual relationships were changed.  However, this 
seems highly conjecture and unlikely.  Pateman‘s dependence on the fact that the individual 
cannot be separated from his/her services or work seems to be a flaw in her argument.  While the 
work one does is a part of the self, this does not mean that an employer or client purchases the 
person.  There is still a freedom present in contract theory that allows the person to dictate what 
he or she does.  If the prostitute does not want to have sex with a client (in the case of a free 
agent, not a coerced agent), she does not have to, if she does not want to perform a certain act, 
again, she does not have to.  And similarly, because she has sex with a man, does not mean she 
gives ownership to him or acts as a subordinate.  In prostitution, the prostitute, just like any other 
worker, does not give up her freedom or agree to be dominated, exploited, or oppressed, she 
agrees to have sex, which does not have to entail a lack of choice or consent.    
Conclusion 
One way to look at the three theories discussed above is as sexual ideals rather than 
norms.  All three groups tend to look at sexual ethics as a way to flourish as a human or as how 
best to lead a good life.  In this context, the three theories would argue that under their model, 
one is engaging in the sexual ideal, that this is the ideal manifestation of sexual relationships and 
one should attempt to fulfill the ideal.  If this were what the theories were proposing, then there 
would be little problem with choosing to endorse one or the other.  If one chooses to live up to 
the ideal, and yet fails to accomplish the ideal, this is not immoral, just not as good as the ideal. 
 However, the theories claim that they are describing and analyzing the sexual ‗norms‘ that 
74 
 
already exist in society and in describing the sexual norm, they are not looking to what one ought 
to do but at what most people actually do and whether this is morally acceptable.  The ultimate 
argument that they propose is that anything that goes against their respective theories is immoral, 
not merely less good, but not good at all and indeed morally bad.  So to fulfill what they describe 
as the norm is very different than living up to the ideal.  Because on these views, to fail to fulfill 
the sexual norm, is in itself immoral, not merely a lesser version of the ideal.
185
  Nevertheless, 
the arguments proposed, if indeed they insist are representative of the norm or the actual way in 
which one should engage in sex, ultimately fail to support this claim and therefore do not 
actually provide the evidence that is needed to successfully argue that prostitution and other 
types of sexual acts that go against their theory are morally impermissible. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
PROSTITUTION AS MORALLY ACCEPTABLE 
While there are many sexual ethical theories, such as those discussed in chapter two, that 
condemn prostitution, there are also several liberal theories that support the right to engage in 
prostitution as a morally permissible act.  Many of these theorists rely on John Stuart Mill and 
theories of liberty or autonomy; others look to Kantian ethics for support.  Even many feminists 
view sex in a more liberal manner than the view expressed by Carole Pateman in chapter two and 
accept prostitution as morally acceptable.  However, despite the fact that there are those that 
claim prostitution is not immoral and is in fact morally permissible, these views are not without 
parameters, the most primary being consent.  The majority of western society, or as philosopher 
Seriol Morgan puts it, ―all sensible people agree that consent is necessary for the moral 
permissibility of a sexual act.‖186  Not only do most laymen hold this idea, even most sexual 
ethical theorists believe that consent in some form is necessary for sexual permissibility.  To 
some degree, even the views previously discussed that condemn prostitution as immoral admit 
that consent is a necessary feature of sexual morality.
187
  Nevertheless, the issue is not whether 
consent is necessary but rather, whether consent is sufficient to determine moral permissibility 
and many theorists do not believe it is.    
There are various definitions or ideas of consent that are often used equivocally to the 
detriment of a sound and cohesive theory of consent.  When people discuss what it means to 
consent to something, oftentimes, they mean different things and this causes inconsistencies and 
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confusion which then weakens the foundation of such theories of consent.  Because of these 
misunderstandings, critics often question the legitimacy of using consent as a basis for sexual 
morality while admitting that it is an important feature.  However, many of the additional criteria 
that these critics pose, such as those seen in chapter two introducing love, marriage, naturalness, 
and even political considerations, ultimately fail to provide adequate support beyond the need for 
consent.  Generally, consent is granted as necessary, even among critics of consent theories, but 
is it also sufficient?  It is important to wade through the quagmire of consent to understand why 
critics claim that it is insufficient for determining moral permissibility.  When one consents to 
sex for instance, what exactly does this mean, and further, how does one determine whether such 
consent is valid?  It is important to analyze consent in order to understand the various nuances of 
meaning and their subsequent application to moral permissibility in sexual acts and further, its 
applicability to prostitution. 
Because consent tends to be a common and necessary element of many acts, both sexual 
and non-sexual, it seems to represent a norm in human acts that determines permissibility and 
impermissibility, a norm which the previous theories attempt to create but, ultimately, lack.  
Consent in general is a determining moral factor in many interactions between individuals.  It 
determines the difference between battery and sport, in brawling and boxing, for instance, of 
theft and gift, and more importantly, for this analysis, between rape and sex.
188
  However, there 
are various sexual acts that fall under the umbrella of sex, prostitution included, that are graded 
based on a myriad of considerations that all rest on the degree of volition, which in turn, 
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determines whether consent is present or not to represent a norm for determining permissibility.  
If consent is not present, as stated earlier, acts are ‗normally‘ considered immoral or 
impermissible.   So, what is ‗normalizing‘ about consent that makes it necessary for moral 
considerations?  When is consent valid and how does that relate to sexual ethics in such a way 
that determines moral permissibility?  Further, can it really be argued, as the aforementioned 
theories suggest that consent is not sufficient to determine morally permissible/impermissible 
sexual acts?  The remainder of the chapter will analyze consent generally before turning to its 
relation to sexual ethics and prostitution specifically.      
Valid Consent 
One of the clearest statements of the foundation for a theory of consent is the ―Principle 
of Consentuality‖ found in David Archard‘s text, Sexual Consent, in which he states that ―a 
practice, P, is morally permissible if all those who are parties to P are competent to consent, give 
their valid consent, and the interests of no other parties are significantly harmed.‖  Conversely, 
the ―Principle of Non-consentuality‖ is also considered in whether an act is morally permissible 
and states that ―a practice, P, is morally impermissible if at least one of those who are parties to 
P, and who are competent to consent, does not give their valid consent, even if the interests of no 
other parties are significantly harmed.‖189  These definitions bring to mind the earlier discussion 
of Mill and most theories of consent have a formulation of the Principle of Consentuality that is 
similarly construed.  However, while this states the position of consent theorists, there is still a 
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matter of distinguishing what valid consent really is, when what appears to be consent is not 
really consent at all, which could be a case of being incompetent to consent, and who counts as a 
third party.
190
 
Most theories of consentuality have three conditions or norms that distinguish valid and 
invalid consent: mental competence, informed decisions, and voluntariness.  If any of the three 
components are missing, the consent is invalid, even if a person says ‗yes‘ to a sexual act.191  The 
first criterion, mental competence, amounts to ―both an ability to understand the nature of that to 
which she [or he] is consenting and an ability to make a decision in respect of the matter.‖192  
There are several reasons why a person would lack the necessary capacity to make a decision.  A 
person who is mentally ill or disabled is considered incompetent to consent, as is often 
determined by law, for instance, when a person is deemed unfit to care for his/her estate or 
welfare and this would also apply to sexual consent.  However, while this is a permanent 
incapacity, some incapacities are not permanent.   
A prime example of a lack of mental competence that is temporary is embodied in a 
minor.  Someone who is under the proper ‗age of consent‘ as dictated by the law is, by 
definition, unable to give consent to an act because they are unable to fully comprehend the 
nature of the situation or to make a decision about it.  There are different ages set by law for 
different situations depending on the impact the decision could have on a minor‘s life (such as 
sexual intercourse) or even society at large (as is the case with setting a voting age).  
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Unfortunately, the age of consent that is set by law can oftentimes be problematic as it is 
generally used to determine mental maturity and some individuals mature at differing rates.  
Nevertheless, setting an age under which one lacks the ability to consent is both essential and 
beneficial because it protects the interests and well-being of children.  However, once a person 
‗comes of age‘ they are generally deemed competent to consent, thus making the incapacity 
merely temporary.
193
   
Another instance which invalidates consent due to a temporarily diminished mental 
capacity involves the use of drugs and alcohol as well as temporary mental disturbances.  Of the 
examples used for incompetence, drug and alcohol use is the most difficult to establish because 
in each case, the level of incapacity is problematic to determine.  How incapacitated must 
someone be before they are deemed unable to consent to an act?  As David Archard claims, 
―Clearly a comatose person is not able to consent to (or even properly participate in) sexual 
activity.  But, even short of being unconscious, somebody may be so drunk as not to be aware of 
what they are doing or incapable of making a decision.‖194  Drugs and alcohol affect people 
differently and this makes for a complicated determination of valid consent, nevertheless, it is an 
important and vital case in which individuals who are generally mentally competent are unable to 
properly give consent.  However, critics may claim that drug and alcohol use are not necessarily 
applicable to determining competence because of the voluntary nature of partaking in these 
substances.  When one chooses to drink alcohol or use drugs, for the most part, that individual is 
aware of the risks involved in partaking of the substance and this includes an awareness of a 
diminished capacity to make rational decisions.  Because the individual is cognizant of the 
possibility, critics could claim that, in a sense, they are consenting to what happens as a result of 
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their actions.  While this claim is controversial, there have been legal cases in which allegations 
of rape were dismissed because of a similar interpretation of consent.
195
  This type of ‗consent‘ is 
referred to as ‗indirect consent‘ or ‗tacit consent‘196 and will be discussed in more detail later in 
the chapter.  But it tends to go against the moral grain when an agent who has had so much to 
drink that they are unconscious or belligerent is able to make decisions, much less consent to 
anything.  When one chooses to take a drink or partake in drugs, does this mean that since they 
consent to this act, they consent to any possible outcome or consequence of this action?  It seems 
unlikely and incorrect to assume so, especially when this involves an unwanted or unconscious 
sexual interaction. 
Hence, drug and alcohol use seems to be distinguishable from temporary mental 
disturbances because of the involuntary nature of such disturbances.  However, there is a 
similarity between the two instances, primarily in the complexity of determining whether a 
‗mental breakdown‘ or, more serious, mental illness is sufficient to invalidate consent.  This 
difficulty rests in the sometimes unreliability of determining incapacitation.  Nevertheless, 
mental disorders such as extreme depression
197
 and anxiety affect the way in which individuals 
behave, causing them to act erratically, irrationally, or ‗out of character‘ which influence the 
capacity to properly consent.  The more serious the mental disturbance, the easier it is to 
determine the inability to consent.  However, in certain circumstances, such as ‗temporary 
insanity‘ or even extreme phobia, a decision to consent to a situation can be invalid if the mental 
disturbance is sufficiently severe.  There are certain legal cases in which a person consents under 
‗extreme mental stress‘ and the consent given is invalid.   However, these mental disorders or 
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stresses are not generally permanent and can be remedied with the use of prescription medication 
or sometimes with time.  If the illness cannot be remedied, then it is of the more serious mental 
disorders spoken of previously and valid consent cannot be given in such cases.   
The second criterion, and typically the most disputed, that is necessary for proper consent 
depends on having relevant information about what it is to which an agent is consenting.  
Making an informed decision on whether to consent involves a necessary understanding of the 
relevant facts that one can know about that to which one is consenting.  If one does not have the 
relevant facts or details surrounding the situation, one may give their consent to something to 
which they did not intend.  One of the most common issues with this criterion surrounds what it 
means to be informed of the relevant facts.  Who or what determines which pieces of information 
are relevant or not?  Archard, as well as other theorists, contends that ―The person does not need 
to know everything, only everything that would make a real difference to whether or not she 
[/he] consented.‖198  Some facts are understood to be relevant for most people, for instance if an 
agent is contemplating consenting to sex with an individual, knowledge of a sexually 
transmittable disease, marital status, or age is, perhaps, relevant to the decision, whereas liking 
the color blue is not.  The relevant facts, according to these theorists, can include a number of 
things but tend to include ―what is being consented to, prior or background information bearing 
on that which is consented to, or what may transpire in consequence of the giving of consent.‖199  
One potential problem with such an understanding of ‗all the relevant‘ information is what to 
make of such considerations as whether consenting to something will make me better off
200
, or 
will be enjoyable, or even how to determine if a particular piece of information would be 
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relevant to that particular person.  In considering the first two, these are things that can only be 
known in hindsight.  They are not something an agent can know, so, for our purposes, they 
cannot be a ‗fact‘ until it has past or until the agent has consented, thus, they are not ‗relevant‘ to 
the actual decision-making process. When Archard states that ―what may transpire in 
consequence of the giving of consent‖ is also significant, he does not, and it seems most consent 
theorists would not, intend that the actual consequences be known, only potential consequences.  
Most people, therefore, understand that when placing a bet one may win or lose, when having 
sex may enjoy it or not, or consenting to heart surgery may live or die.  If one did not know these 
things, as most notably could occur with the surgery example, the person gaining consent should 
inform the consenter of the possibilities or consequences.  It is not about understanding whether 
it will or will not benefit the agent that makes this information necessary, but rather, whether the 
agent is being deceived or misled.  If A is deliberately attempting to get B to consent to 
something and A is withholding a fact that A believes may cause B to refuse consent, then A is 
doing something impermissible and the consent that is obtained would be invalid.  Additionally, 
if B is misleading or withholding information that ‗most people‘ would want to consider in their 
deliberation of consent, this should be divulged.  The less a person knows of another, the more 
they should include pertinent, foreseeable information.  This seems to be the important and key 
interpretation to understand what should be understood by ‗relevant information,‘ not knowledge 
about every minute detail, which could not possibly be known or communicated.   
The requirement for informed consent to sexual interaction is reflected to some degree in 
the law.  If one misrepresents pertinent facts about the interaction, and obtains consent because 
of this, the individual can be prosecuted for rape or a lesser charge of fraudulent 
misrepresentation.  There are two primary types of fraud that the law recognizes as being 
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relevant to falsely obtaining consent; they are ―fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement.  
The first constitutes a misrepresentation of the act itself or the identity of the persons involved in 
the act; the second, of some state of affairs which supplies a motive for the other to consent.‖201  
Fraud in the factum would involve an agent not knowing that sexual intercourse was taking 
place. An example of this would be a woman, during a gynecological exam, being led to believe 
that the doctor was using a gynecological instrument to examine her, but instead was inserting 
his penis (not the proper instrument) into the vaginal canal and engaging in intercourse with her 
without her knowledge.  The second possible type of fraud in the factum involves not knowing 
who it is with whom one is engaging in sex.
202
  There have been cases, for example, both real 
and fictional of twins switching places and it could be the case that an agent agrees to have sex 
with one twin being led to believe it was the other.
203
  While it may be that the individual 
verbally consented to an act, because he/she did not actually have the correct information, that 
agent would be unable to give valid consent since ―a person cannot subjectively choose 
something for [him/] herself without being aware of it.‖204  Consent is an act; however, it is also 
a choice, and one cannot choose to act if one does not have the information that would allow a 
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choice to take place.  Thus, any form of consent obtained in these cases of ignorance would be 
invalid and would not really be sexual consent at all, but rather rape.   
While cases of fraud in the factum are typically considered to be rape under the law, 
fraud in the inducement is not usually classified as strictly, though sometimes it can be.  
Nevertheless, while the law does not always recognize fraud in the inducement as rape, it is still 
often considered a case of fraud and can be tried as such.  However, simply because the law does 
not penalize fraud in the inducement as harshly as in factum, does not necessarily make fraud in 
the inducement morally permissible.  And according to many consent theorist, cases of fraud in 
the inducement that do not disclose relevant information pertaining to the act or decision to 
consent are morally impermissible because as stated earlier, a person cannot choose to consent to 
something of which he/she does not have proper knowledge.  If a person is misled by trivial facts 
that may or may not affect the consent that is granted (such as being led to believe the potential 
sexual partner went to an Ivy league school as opposed to some less prestigious university), it 
may still be censured in some manner while not making it completely impermissible, but rather 
unfavorable or less than ideal.  The reason for this seems to be the seriousness of the 
consequences of the deception.  If to use the same example, Agent A convinces, by deception, 
Agent B that A attended a better university, and B is impressed and more willing to engage in 
sexual intercourse because of the lie, but not solely because of it, B is wronged by the lie, but not 
in a significant manner, B may feel cheated and may regret being misled and perhaps even desire 
that the sexual relationship had not taken place.  Nevertheless, the lie was one of a myriad of 
considerations, and as it stands, Agent B may have been less likely to sleep with A, but such a lie 
does not alter the consequences of the consent very much.  On the other hand, if Agent A has a 
sexually transmitted disease or is married, and Agent B is not aware of or is lied to about these 
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facts, and such fact would have been a significant reason for rejecting or consenting to the sexual 
intercourse, or alters the moral tenor of the act and the consequences then change, then the act is 
morally impermissible.  When an agent engages in sexual intercourse with someone who has a 
sexually transmittable disease and is not made aware of the affliction, the consequences of the 
action are severely and significantly different than an agent who does not have the disease and 
the moral consequences are changed as a result.  Similarly, if an agent engages in sexual 
intercourse with an agent and is unaware that he/she is married, the moral tenor of the 
consequences of the act are also significantly changed because of the way in which it affects the 
third party, namely, the spouse.  Some agents, upon being made aware of the facts may still 
choose to engage in sexual intercourse, despite the facts, yet, in many cases being lied to or 
misled about certain facts that have a significant impact on the consequences of consent ought to 
be disclosed to have valid consent.  While there are various degrees to which a person can be lied 
to or misled into engaging in sexual intercourse, ―the more completely a person is misled, the 
less willingly [the agent] can be said to engage in that act, and the more wronged [the agent] is if 
[the agent] does engage in that act.‖205  So, while there are degrees of wrongfulness depending 
on the amount of deception and volition, and fraud in the factum may be considered intuitively 
and legally more serious, fraud in the inducement also has moral consequences depending on the 
seriousness of the lie or omission and in a case of ‗the little white lie‘ may be morally acceptable 
though less than ideal or in the case of a sexually transmitted disease, can be as equally 
impermissible as fraud in the factum which may invalidate consent. 
The third criterion that is necessary for valid consent is voluntariness which is, in some 
cases, closely related to the second criterion of having pertinent knowledge about the situation to 
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which one is considering consenting but, in other ways, surpasses simply being informed about a 
case.  Volition is the most important component to consent because the previous two criteria are 
ways in which volition is either lacking (competence) or impeded (lack of information).  In order 
for an act to be truly voluntary or free, a person must know to what it is he/she is agreeing.  The 
less the agent knows, the less free the agent is in choosing to consent.  However, there are cases 
at the top of the scale in which there is no choice, such as when force, threat, or coercion is used.  
In all three of these cases consent is never given because of the lack of voluntariness.  All the 
same, there are cases in which an agent appears to ‗freely‘ consent to something which on the 
surface seems valid (i.e. there is no outward coercion or threat perceived) but upon further study 
is actually invalid.   
There are certain situations in which an action or choice falls somewhere in a gradient 
between completely unfree (compulsion by physical force) and free (completely voluntary).  As 
Joel Feinberg states,  
There are many ways of ‗getting‘ a person to act as you want him[/her] to act, but 
only some of these can be described as ‗forcing him[/her] to act.‘  Some of these 
various techniques…can be placed on a spectrum of force running from 
compulsion proper, at one extreme, through compulsive pressure, coercion 
proper, and coercive pressure, to manipulation, persuasion, enticement, and 
simple requests at the other extreme. … It is only techniques in the forcing part of 
the spectrum (wherever that boundary is drawn) that reduce or nullify the 
voluntariness of the induced response.
206
 
 
Compulsion and force are ways of acting toward a person without permission, there is no consent 
involved, it is something done to a person, not something to which there is any choice.
207
  One 
way in which Feinberg describes the shift between volition and coercion is by determining where 
the responsibility for the act lies.  He claims that consent ―transfers responsibility.‖  In an initial 
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interaction, agent A is asked to consent to x by agent B.  If B performs x without the consent of 
A, B is at fault or morally responsible for x, while A is not in the least culpable because B is 
obligated to refrain from x until the consent is given.    If, however, B solicits consent from A 
and A grants the consent, both A and B are morally responsible and thus responsibility is 
transferred from B alone to both A and B.
208
  This occurs, Feinberg argues, because ―The point 
and effect of consent is not to create an obligation of the consenter; rather it is to grant a 
privilege to the consentee.  Where formerly he [B] had a duty to refrain from doing X, now he 
[B] is at liberty to do X (at least until the consent is revoked).‖209  This transfer of responsibility 
is due to the authorization A grants B to do x.  When A consents, A is granting authorization to 
B.  If A does not consent, there is no authorization granted and thus the liability lies completely 
with B because there is a duty not to do x without consent from A.  However, Feinberg argues 
that in some cases, specifically prostitution, it may be better to speak of granting ―permission 
rather than authorization‖  because  ―any act that crosses the boundaries of a sovereign person‘s 
zone of autonomy requires that person‘s ―permission‖: otherwise it is wrongful.  In this sense all 
sovereign persons, like sovereign nations, have ‗authority‘ over their own realms.‖210  Consent is 
so important in determining moral permissibility because it clearly delineates when a person‘s 
rights have been violated and where the responsibility for an act lays, both in sexual and 
nonsexual situations.  The more voluntary the act, the more permissible it is morally because 
there is a choice involved.  The various degrees of volition, as quoted above by Feinberg, depend 
on the amount of choice involved in obtaining consent.   The less one is able to choose, as in 
compulsion for example, the less voluntary (there is no choice at all) which makes the consent 
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invalid, and thus, morally unacceptable.  While consent obtained through enticement, as in the 
case with sales rewards, can be morally unfavorable in some circumstances, are for the most part, 
morally acceptable because there is a great degree of freedom of choice.
211
  For any act of 
consent to be valid, it must be free and informed, as well as given by an agent that is mentally 
competent.  If these criteria are not met, the consent is not valid.   
Obligation: Consent vs. Promises 
Nevertheless, Feinberg‘s interpretation of consent in this case contrasts in some sense 
with what Archard states in his text.  Archard claims that when A consents to x, A does indeed 
create an obligation to B or an obligation to do x or at least not to prevent x from occurring.  He 
states that ―If I consent to the doing of something, I put myself under some sort of obligation in 
respect of that doing.‖212  He goes on to say that ―It may be that I consent to do the thing in 
question—I agree to organize the meeting, and I should then take steps to realize that end.‖  This 
statement seems perfectly acceptable, since in consenting, the agent is consenting to do 
something, in which case it can be understood as a promise.  For example, if A‘s boss asks A to 
hold a meeting, and A consents, what A is consenting to is something A must actively do.  A 
says, ‗yes, I will organize the meeting,‘ this statement, though an act of consent, is stated as a 
promise to do something, in which case A is under an obligation to perform the act of organizing 
the meeting.  If A does not, then A is, in a sense, breaking a promise or contract.  However, this 
is a different situation than what Feinberg states in his text.  For Feinberg, A is allowing B to do 
something.  In Archard‘s case A agrees to actively do something.  These are different situations, 
which obviously have the potential to lead to different conclusions.  The consent that seems to be 
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most significant in sexual ethics is that which allows another, B, to do something which he/she 
was previously obligated not to do, though the other type which Archard discusses here may also 
be present in some situations, especially prostitution.   
However, Archard brings another example to the table, which would indeed apply to 
Feinberg‘s sense of consent since there are things to which people consent that do not involve 
agreeing to actively do something, but rather allow the other to do something.  This seems to be 
the case which Feinberg is describing in his analysis.  And, while perhaps a small issue, 
Archard‘s analysis leads to much too strong of a statement and must be explored.  Archard 
continues with an example that, ―It may be that I consent to someone‘s else [sic] doing of 
something, in which case I am obliged not to obstruct their doing of it.‖213  This also seems 
acceptable, because, for example, if A consents to B‘s borrowing A‘s book, A is granting 
permission to use it and is thus under a negative obligation, or an obligation not to do something, 
in this case not to prevent B from using the book.  This is not an obligation in the sense of 
actively doing something; it is a matter of refraining from doing something, which is not 
necessarily inconsistent with Feinberg‘s interpretation, though it would be a bit of a stretch.  Yet, 
Archard adds an additional obligation for A which is very strong and does not seem founded that 
leads to some potential problems with consent if accepted.  Archard claims that if A consents to 
B‘s doing something, in addition to the negative obligation, A may also be under a positive 
obligation to assist B.  He claims that it may be necessary to ―assist their doing of it in a manner 
indicated by the giving of the consent.  If I agree to a friend‘s using my house while I am away, I 
should give them a key, not change the locks or move others in beforehand.‖214  While the 
second claim, that ―I should not change the locks,‖ is in keeping with the negative obligation of 
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A not to prevent the permission, the first, giving a key, and the third, not moving someone in 
beforehand, do not appear to be legitimate types of obligations.  In granting permission to 
another to do something (consenting to their doing it) this does not seem to put A under any 
positive obligation to aid unless this aid was consented to, in which case A must give the keys to 
B if B asks for permission to use the keys as well.  It only puts A in a negative obligation not to 
prevent B‘s actions.  So while A consents to B using the house and while the key is the best way 
to enter the house (though not the only way), A does not appear to be under an obligation to give 
the keys to B, only not to prevent B from using the house and since there are alternate ways to 
get into the house, A is not necessarily preventing B from using the house.  This may seem 
intuitively strange since in most cases of borrowing a house, car, etc, a key is an essential feature 
of its use.  One could possibly claim that the key is a part of the house, and since it is a part of 
the house, agreeing to use the house is agreeing to use each part of the house, and thus use the 
key as well.  However, there are some instances in which there is not a connection such as there 
is between the house and the key.  Simply because something is a convention or typically 
happens in conjunction, does not seem to necessarily mean that consent to one is consent to the 
other.  However, is it the case that when an agent consents to one act, the agent also consents to 
another which he/she does not expressly consent?  Further, is there an obligation involved to 
which the agent had no intention of consenting?        
These different types of obligation involved in the giving of consent which Archard 
describes seem to be linked to what he calls indirect consent, of which there are different types, 
two common types are frequently referred to as implied and/or tacit consent.  The former type of 
91 
 
consent ―is implied by, or can be understood from, a person‘s actions.‖215  If A asks to enter B‘s 
office and B steps to the side and waves his arm in the direction of the office, this is often viewed 
as valid consent based on the actions of B, not on express verbal consent.  Another common 
example is in the context of an auction, A understands that B consents to bid when B raises B‘s 
hand.  The context and the conventions are often important and can often be seen as giving 
consent even though no express consent has been given.  This, however, is not always 
straightforward.  As Archard notes, context and convention are not the same everywhere and 
implied consent based on these things can sometimes be troublesome because conventions vary.  
A nod does not mean yes everywhere, just as raising one‘s eyebrows can indicate different things 
in different situations.  So, implied consent cannot always be interpreted as valid, though often it 
is understood to be so.  And in many cases it is necessary to verbally confirm that consent is 
indeed being given, despite implied consent, which even Feinberg seems to accept as mostly 
valid. 
Tacit consent ―can be understood as arguing that if you expressly consent to P, then you 
may be taken as tacitly consenting to Q—‗if it would be generally taken that consenting to P 
involves consenting to Q.‘‖216  Tacit consent is generally linked to John Locke in the second of 
his Two Treatises on Government, in which he argues that any man born under a government 
who then lives his life under that government, consents to the rules and laws of the government 
when he partakes of the benefits of that government.
217
  Or more strongly stated in reference to 
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Thomas Hobbes, ―A person consents to all the consequences that he knows are necessary effects 
of his voluntary acts.‖218  Archard claims that not all types of indirect consent are acceptable, but 
that some cases may in fact lead to an obligation on the part of the consenter.  Archard claims 
there are three cases in which consent can validly be implied or considered by law to be indirect 
(tacit) consent to an act: accompaniment, consequence, and precondition.  ―First,‖ states 
Archard, ―Q could be an accompaniment of P, that is, it is not possible to do P without at the 
same time doing Q.‖219  His example relates to electricity consumption when using a television.  
If A consents to B watching his/her television (P), then A consents to B using the electricity (Q), 
which is necessary to the functioning of the television.  These two things are connected in such a 
way that a person cannot possibly do one without at the same time doing the other.  ―Second, Q 
might inevitably succeed P. … Third, Q might be a precondition of P.‖220  Archard uses medical 
procedures to serve as examples for succession and precondition.  For the former, he claims that 
in consenting to an operation (P), one also consents to the outcome of the operation (Q).  
However, this is not so straightforward because there can be many potential outcomes, some 
more likely than others to occur.  While if it is the case that P occurs, then the outcome could be 
Q, R, S, T, U, or V.  So, while an outcome inevitable succeeds the operation, which outcome is 
not inevitable.  So, if A consents to a heart transplant or some other surgery, and death is one of a 
myriad of possible outcomes, the argument would follow that one consented indirectly to death 
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even though it was not the preferred outcome.  In the latter case of precondition, Archard argues 
that if a patient agrees to an operation (P), the patient also consents to the anesthetic (Q) that 
must precede it. This last example is the weakest, since, in agreeing to surgery (P), patients can 
easily refuse anesthetic (Q) or the situation may be that there is no anesthetic available, in which 
case the surgery can still take place without the administration of the anesthetic (Q).  However, 
one must be careful in the link between P and Q, simply because the administration of an 
anesthetic (Q) usually happens first, does not mean that it must.  While his example may be 
faulty, the form is not since there are instances where some action P cannot actually happen 
without action Q occurring.   
Despite Archard‘s claim that these three cases are lawful cases of indirect consent and are 
valid, he qualifies his remark by claiming that it is also necessary that a person is aware of the 
link between the two actions (P and Q).  If an agent is unaware of the connection between the 
two, then indirect consent cannot be viewed as valid.
221
  While Archard holds that these three 
types of relationships between consent and indirect consent are valid, he admits that there are 
potential problems with the connection and some may argue that they have ―not consented to 
what is nevertheless a necessary accompaniment to or inevitable consequence of that to which 
they have consented.‖222  Part of the problem with the three cases of indirect consent to which 
someone may object rests with the perceived connection between P and Q.  Some connections 
are seen as necessary or typical, but as alluded to earlier, are merely conventions that do not hold 
for everyone.  Many times it is difficult to determine if an action has a necessary connection to 
that which is consented.  For example, one can argue that the anesthetic is not a necessary 
precondition, though it is common.  An agent may be in a place where there is no available 
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anesthetic or it may be against the agent‘s religious beliefs to use anesthetic, in which case, the 
anesthetic is not necessary.  Similarly, one can argue simply because death is one of several 
possibilities as a result of an operation that the patient does not consent to death.  If one accepts 
these as representing consent simply because they normally happen or they are part of a 
convention, there seems to be a problem.   
   Archard‘s argument for tacit and implied consent, while seemingly logical and valid on 
the surface can lead to a dangerous construal of consent when relying on conventions.  The 
reason for using caution when using tacit or indirect consent can be seen in the example used by 
Lord Matthew Hale when discussing what he referred to as the ―marital exemption‖ to the law of 
rape.
223
  Hale‘s argument, which was the standard view until recently, and in fact is still held by 
many, was that when a woman agreed to marry a man, she indirectly consented to all future 
sexual intercourse with that man and thus, a husband could not be convicted of rape because the 
agreement was tacitly consented to by the marriage contract.  In other words, in consenting to P 
(marriage), the woman also consented to Q (sex with the husband at any time) because Q was a 
known consequence of P.  Today, this seems outrageous to most people and, indeed, it should.  
The argument would be that since the woman consented to marry the man, and she knows that 
there is a possibility of her husband forcing her or wanting to engage in sex when she herself did 
not wish to engage in sexual intercourse, that she consents to forced/coerced intercourse in 
consenting to marriage.  What is essential to this argument is that a woman who agrees to marry 
a man is viewed as indirectly consenting to the typical conventions of marriage.  However, these 
conventions are not uniform or indeed are often morally objectionable whether common or not.  
A wife who is forced to have sexual intercourse against her will did not give consent and should 
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not be seen as giving indirect consent because she agreed to marry a man and most married 
people engage in sexual intercourse.
224
  Even if sexual access was explicitly stated in the 
marriage contract, force would never be an acceptable means to obtaining it.  While the woman 
may be considered to be in a breach of contract, this does not give the husband the right to force 
it of the wife, but rather to merely engage legal aid in her breach of contract.  And if the wife 
should change her mind about the sexual access, she could then break/amend the contract.   
The basis for indirect and tacit consent tends to lie in the participation in certain social 
activities which have many potential consequences, some foreseen, some not.  Just as in the 
medical example, in which the patient is aware of the possibility of death, which occurred, the 
patient consented to death, the woman in being aware of the possibility of forced intercourse is 
aware of the possibility and it occurs, she consented.  Succession and precondition seem to lead 
to many problems with consent.  Simply because as Archard claims, there is a lawful basis of 
indirect consent based on precondition and succession, does not mean it is always morally 
permissible.  What is lawful and what is moral do not always coincide and frequently conflict.  
Still, simply because consent to P leads to tacit consent to Q, does not necessarily create an 
obligation on the part of the agent as Archard claims, it simply adds an additional act of consent 
on the part of the agent to allow Q to occur.  It is obvious why Archard believes there is an 
obligation or promise inferred because of this additional consent, however, there is no reason to 
necessitate obligation, but only to include an additional act of consent which does not imply 
obligation.   
Feinberg, while also agreeing that tacit and implied consent are often valid and may lead 
to consent to an action which A did not expressly authorize, nevertheless, argues that simply 
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because one consents to something in a weak sense (i.e. ―you may‖) does not mean that they 
consent in the strong sense (i.e. ―please do‖).  People often consent to something that they do not 
want to happen and thus do not intend to put themselves under any obligation to aid in the act.
225
  
The difference between putting oneself under an obligation to do something through a promise, 
and consenting depends on the immediate effects.  Feinberg claims that while different situations 
often involve a mixture of consent and promises, depending on the situation, ―the immediate 
effect of promises is to create an obligation in the speaker; the immediate effect of acts of 
consent is to cancel obligations in the one addressed.‖226   Further, he argues that ―In no case 
should the act of consent itself be construed as a promise.‖227  This is because the two concepts 
are indeed separate and while certain situations involve a combination of the two, consent is 
altogether different from a promise.  So, to recap, in the earlier examples, where A consents to 
B‘s doing something, borrowing the car for example, and seemingly puts him/herself under an 
obligation, this is not the case because there is not always or even necessarily promise involved 
in consent.  Indeed, A may not really want B to use the car despite the consent. The situation 
may be such that A does give the keys to B or does not prevent B from using the car, but A is not 
under an obligation to B simply because of the consent, but rather consents tacitly to allowing B 
to use the keys (with no additional obligation).  Depending on the situation, if a separate promise 
to do something was given, then A is under an obligation.  Some situations in which consent is 
given may also include an active agreement to do something, in which case a promise is given, 
but this does not logically follow from the act of granting consent but rather may accompany it 
without being synonymous with it.  
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When is volition obstructed?: Threats vs. Offers 
While a promise and consent may be different things, certain situations in which consent 
is attempting to be obtained, such as offers, threats, and contracts, ―involve a complex interplay 
of acts of consent and promises.‖228  The degree of this interplay makes the agent either more or 
less free to act when one considers the differences in how the consent and promises are obtained.  
Offers and some contracts differ from threats in that a threat is primarily structured as a ‗do this 
or else‘ in which a person really is not given a true choice in the matter because if he or she does 
not comply, he/she is left worse off (by death, injury, etc).  In other words, a threat is a form of 
negative coercion in which the victim is not given a real or viable choice and is thus unfree and 
unable to choose and thus not really under any obligation at all.  Some contracts involve threats 
and if they do, they are invalid.  Significantly, Archard claims that a threat does not have to be 
actually existent for the freedom of the agent to be called into question.  He claims  
that consent may be invalid if a coercive threat is reasonably believed to be made, 
yet none is intended.  … When the harm threatened is sincerely, even if not truly, 
believed to be significant, proximate, and real, whether the threat is explicit or 
implicit, then the consent obtained is invalid.
229
    
 
The example that Archard uses here involves an actor playing a thief.  If the thief-actor, instead 
of confronting the actor opposite, accidentally attempted to rob an innocent passerby who he/she 
thought was an actor, even though the actor is not actually intending to threaten the civilian, the 
passerby still feels that the threat is real, despite there not being an actual or intended threat 
present.  The fear and the belief of threat are present and thus the consent (to hand over the 
wallet/purse) is invalidly obtained.  Additionally, Archard uses the example of an agent believing 
that a stranger who has struck up a conversation with the agent is actually an escaped criminal 
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and when this stranger begins talking to the agent, the agent believes that this perceived 
dangerous person will cause harm if he/she does not do as the stranger suggests.
230
  Similarly, 
Feinberg describes instances of compulsion in which a victim is compelled to consent under 
severe psychological trauma and ―paralysis‖ which is ―independent of the will.‖231  This type of 
psychological effect, he claims can be difficult to determine, as with mental illnesses and 
disturbances, primarily because they resemble a sudden ‗change of mind‘ which is essentially a 
choice to consent.
232
  Threats can be implied or even imagined, but they are still real to the agent 
and affect the decision-making process.  A threat, real or imagined, invalidates consent because 
of the fear, real or imagined, on which the agent bases his/her decision.   
 Offers and contracts that do not involve threats, on the other hand, present an option 
between either having life improved (through money, fame, etc) or remaining the same as it was 
prior to the offer.  For instance, if A offers to give a car to B in exchange for sex, this is an offer.  
If B refuses, B is in the same position in life as he/she was prior to the offer.  If B accepts, the 
life of the agent is perceived to be improved.  The primary difference between a threat and an 
offer is the situation the agent would be in after refusing.  Feinberg is sure to distinguish offers 
not only from threats but also promises.  He claims, as previously stated, that offers, as opposed 
to threats ―involve a complex interplay of acts of consent and promises … [however,] in no case 
should the act of consent itself be construed as a promise.‖233 
An offer, however, can at times be coercive depending on the economic status of the 
individual or how free the agent is to refuse.  It could be the case that an agent‘s economic status 
puts him/her in such a situation that if the agent refused, the situation in which the agent was left 
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would be dire.  So if, for example, an individual offers a destitute agent money in exchange for 
sex and the agent is so bad off that the money is truly needed for the well-being or subsistence of 
the agent, then the agent may be in the same situation that the victim of a threat is in, namely, a 
risk to the life of the agent.  If an agent will likely starve without the money, then it is very 
similar to a threat (though admittedly not the same).  The agent is worse off than before and it 
could be argued, fears for his/her life.  Compare this situation with two others.  Suppose a 
wealthy individual offers an underprivileged, but not destitute, agent money in exchange for sex.  
If the agent accepts the offer, the situation of the agent is improved.  If the agent refuses, the 
situation is unfavorable, but remains the same.  Now consider a middle-class agent being offered 
money in exchange for sex.  This agent does not need the money, but again, the situation would 
be improved.  In these three cases, the moral permissibility seems different.  In the latter case, a 
desire to improve life (Archard calls this greed) is the motive for accepting.  The agent is free to 
accept the situation and equally free to refuse the situation.  The offer widens the possibilities for 
the agent.  In the case of the underprivileged agent, the freedom of choice seems less free than 
that of the middle-class agent.  The insufficiency of income for the second agent limits the 
potential avenues for income and the offer, while widening the possibilities for the agent, also 
make opposing the offer more difficult (though not impossible) than the middle-class agent 
because of the economic situation of the agent.  The choice of the absolutely destitute agent is 
much less free than the previous two examples and leaves one to question whether it is truly free 
at all.  This agent is indeed out of options.
234
  Here Archard claims, ―greed is not at issue in the 
situation where … [the agent] is so poor, so destitute, and so starving as to have no choice but to 
agree to anything [the individual] proposes so long as it provides [the agent] with some measure 
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of relief from [the] desperate situation.‖235  He further argues that the individual offering the 
money need not even be very rich or demand sex, the agent would be willing to truly do anything 
in order to gain relief from the situation.  The three distinct economic situations of the agents 
affect the level of freedom of choice in the event of an offer.  Even if the three agents were 
offered the exact something, the consent that was obtained would be morally different in each of 
the situations.  Archard argues that the destitute agent does not really choose, but is left with no 
choice due to the situation and ―agrees out of dire necessity, and may be said to no more consent 
than she would of agreeing with a gun to [the] head.‖236  While Archard‘s assessment of the 
destitute agent seems likely to be a case of invalid consent and less morally permissible than the 
previous two agents, it is important to point out that while the agent may have no more choice 
than if threatened, a threat is a different situation than the coercive offer.    
So, while threats can be present even in offers depending on the economic status of the 
agent they can also be present depending on the relationship between individuals.  These 
differing relationships tend to be reflected in power differentials, as in the case with 
patient/doctor, teacher/student, and boss/employee.  However, simply because there is a 
difference in situation, does not automatically mean that there is a coercive relationship present.  
Nevertheless, if, for example, A‘s boss offers a promotion in exchange for altering the accounts, 
stealing information from another company, or sex and A believes that if he/she refuses the 
boss‘s offer, then he/she will be fired or there will  be other negative consequences for refusing, 
this can be seen as coercive.  Because, as argued earlier by Archard and Feinberg, the threat does 
not have to be real for the agent to believe it is present.  In these cases, of threats and coercive 
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offers, consent is not truly voluntary and the agent, in a sense, is unfree to properly or validly 
choose to consent, not just to sex, but to most offers.
237
   
Why Does Consent Matter in Sex?  
There are some dangers to endorsing many of the criticisms of sexual consent, such as the 
idea that consent during sex is somehow passion-killing or unnecessary.  For example, the idea 
that sexual acts are complete acts or are representative of a complete act in which there is an end 
goal that is the same each time, as Aquinas (and to some degree even Scruton) argues, seems 
problematic.  This model does not allow for levels of intimacy or degrees of actions which can 
be consented to or not depending on the situation and this model leads to several serious and 
unfavorable implications for sexual morality.  To claim, as many do, that there is a specific, 
uniform telos or function or end purpose to a sexual act, is to adhere to the idea that anything that 
falls short of that telos is incomplete or less than the full act and therefore unfulfilled.
238
  So the 
idea many have, especially those who look to a ‗function‘ of sex, that penetration and ejaculation 
are the end result of a ‗successful‘ sexual interaction, leads to the morally unfavorable 
conclusion that consent interrupts this process and cannot be revoked in the midst of sexual 
interactions because it results in a lack of fulfillment of the function of sexual interaction.  This 
tends to be coupled with the idea that when one (many times the man) is ―in the grips of passion‖ 
this individual tends to be unable to control him (or her) self, and perhaps is less responsible for 
the subsequent actions, and the other (typically the woman) should recognize this as a result of 
sexual intercourse and therefore be sympathetic to the situation.
239
  This almost excuses the agent 
who is unable to control the sexual urges or drives he/she has and negates an exchange of 
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consent to various degrees of sexual interaction.  Archard claims that it seems to obligate the 
other who ―goes most of the way‖ to ―go all the way.‖  This is a dangerous path to tread and the 
destination requires the other to act when there is not consent to the act.
240
  Simply because an 
agent agrees to have sex with an individual, does not mean that the agent must engage in 
whatever type of sex in which the other wishes to engage.  For example, an agent may consent to 
vaginal penetration, but not anal.  Or more likely, if an agent consents to sexual intercourse, but 
it is not proceeding in a manner in which the agent is comfortable, for instance if the partner 
becomes violent, engages in a practice in which the agent did not consider, or even if the 
interaction becomes unpleasant or painful, the agent should be able to revoke consent or even in 
some situations, it may be said that what the agent consented to is no longer occurring and the 
‗consent‘ is thus invalidated.  In the view where the function of sex is penetration and ejaculation 
as the telos, there is no revoking or negating consent once the agent gives the initial consent 
because there is a process which is included that does not admit of levels or degrees of intimacy.  
Consent theories tend to reject such a concrete analysis of sexual interactions and intercourse and 
allow for the possibility of altered situations and/or a change in the encounter which affects the 
consent that was initially given, resulting in the revocation of consent or even one could argue 
that the situation is changed in such a way that it results in a lack of proper consent in the first 
place.
241
   
Sexual interaction is often cited as being directly associated with the self in such a way 
that sex cannot help but be a deeply significant act, one in which individuals guard against 
infraction and unwanted advances.  Many sexual ethicists, including the previous theorists 
discussed in chapter two, often link sexual intercourse and sexual desire to the self in such a way 
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that they believe sex produces a vulnerability in an individual and because of this, sex has a 
‗special‘ significance.  Because of this significance, theorists often link sex to other extraneous 
things which alter the moral flavor of sexual interaction when absent.  This is part of the reason 
Scruton attaches love to sex as a necessary feature, and why Aquinas and sociobiologists look for 
the ‗function‘ of sex.  But it seems most plausible to link sex to the self, not in a special or 
significantly different way than other acts, but through autonomy, upon which acts of consent, 
both sexual and not, depend.  Archard states that ―as incarnated beings we have a very strong 
interest in regulating and controlling access to our bodies.  This interest is rooted in 
considerations of self-esteem, integrity, and personal dignity.‖242  While this seems to be the 
case, it is a matter of autonomy and sovereignty that determines an individual‘s integrity, dignity, 
and self-esteem.  Because of this, consent, to sex and other acts involving the embodied self, is 
the most important determining factor in whether an act is morally permissible or not.  If a 
person consents to sex, and that consent is valid, it does not matter if he/she is fulfilling the 
biological function of sex or not, whether he/she is in love or not, or whether they are acting in a 
way that provides pleasure or not.  What matters is that the individual had a choice to consent, 
validly consented, and was essentially autonomous in the choice to act.   
Oftentimes when consent theorists discuss autonomy, they rely on Kantian ethics, 
specifically treating others as not merely a means, but also as an end.  The typical consent 
theorist interprets this in a specific manner, which is often believed to serve as the basis for the 
necessity and sufficiency for consent in sexual ethics.  As Archard explains, ―the Kantian 
principle does not proscribe treating another as a means; it rules out treating the other merely as a 
means.  It is permissible to treat another as a means provided that one also treats them as an 
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end.‖243  Similarly, Thomas Mappes, in his essay, ―Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using 
Another Person,‖ explicates the principle in the following manner, 
According to a fundamental Kantian principle, it is morally wrong for A to use B 
merely as a means (to achieve A‘s ends).  Kant‘s principle does not rule out A 
using B as a means, only A using B merely as a means, that is, in a way 
incompatible with respect for B as a person.
244
 
 
Mappes goes on to say that the best way to interpret ‗using another person‘ is doing something 
without their ―voluntary informed consent.‖245  These two interpretations tend to be the start of a 
Kantian interpretation of consent theories.  However, there is a problem with relying on Kantian 
theories condemning the use of a person without consideration of his/her ends because of the 
various interpretations of ‗using‘ another.  Even Scruton relies on Kantian theories of using 
another person when he formulates his theory of sex by claiming that only reciprocal and 
intentionalizing acts are appropriate in interactions among two parties and constitute treating that 
person as an end as well as a means.  As previously noted, he claims that to use another as 
merely a means is to act without concern for their uniqueness as a person.  Mappes interprets 
using a person as a mere means as acting without his/her voluntary informed consent; many 
critics do not think this is enough.  The variety of interpretations of Kant‘s meaning in this key 
passage is one of the reasons it is difficult to use the theory as a basis because there are strong 
arguments both for and against sexual interactions based on the same principle.   Significantly, 
Mappes and other Kantian theorist supporting consent as an acceptable basis for sexual 
interaction do not always give a reason why consent is important, only that it is the best 
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understanding of this passage and that this is the proper interpretation for using a person as a 
means and an end.   
Critical of the interpretation that Mappes and other such theorists present, Archard 
correctly argues that, simply because A consents to an act with B, does not mean that B is not 
treating A as merely a means.  In a sexual interaction, A may consent to sex with B, and past 
that, B is not concerned with whether A is enjoying the sex or even if A‘s end goal was being 
attended, so long as B is enjoying it and fulfilling B‘s own end.  Many people (Scruton included) 
find this to be morally problematic because even with consent, A does not attend to the 
needs/wants of B.  However, it is not clear that after obtaining consent to sex (or any act) that 
treating another as a mere means is morally impermissible as Kantians claim.  There are many 
scenarios and examples that critics use to disprove or cast doubt upon the Kantian claim that it is 
morally impermissible to use another as a means only, many of which involve retail and the 
relationship between sales and customers, or skilled labor and clients.  For example, if A wants a 
haircut, and goes to B for a haircut, is it morally impermissible for A to use B as merely a means 
to get a haircut, without considering anything further about B past the price of the haircut?  Or 
when hiring a contractor to build a house, is it wrong for A to use that contractor as merely a 
means to furthering A‘s end of building a house?   Similarly, in a sexual interaction, granting that 
it would be wrong to engage in sex without consent as already argued above, is it wrong, as 
Kantians claim, for A to use B as merely a means to sexual gratification once A consents?   
According to Archard, using someone as a mere means to an end is not morally 
problematic.  When trying to understand why Kantians believe it is wrong to use another, he 
looks to manipulation and exploitation as potential supporting ideas behind their claims before 
turning to why it is not morally impermissible to use another in an interaction, both sexual and 
106 
 
nonsexual.  When one condemns using another person or not taking the other person‘s ends into 
account in interactions and claims that is it morally wrong, the typical reason seems to lead either 
to manipulation or exploitation of the other.  Archard asks the reader to ―consider the following 
scenario.‖ 
Harry is a rock star, Sue an adoring fan.  … [Sue] explicitly offers herself 
sexually to Harry.  Harry and Sue sleep together.  It is a one-night stand, and the 
sex is perfunctory and unpleasant to Sue.  In the morning Harry leaves with barely 
an acknowledgement to Sue of what has happened, and they never meet again.
246
 
 
For many, this seems morally problematic.  However, what is it about the situation that makes it 
seem as though Harry is to blame and Sue was somehow used?   
 One potential complaint could be that Harry manipulated Sue in some way.  However, in 
the scenario described, this does not seem to be the case at all.  Harry did not approach Sue, 
rather, Sue approached Harry.  Had Harry been the initiator, perhaps there would be a valid 
concern over manipulation.  So, if the situation was altered and Harry approached Sue, would 
Harry be morally blameworthy?  Manipulation lies somewhere between coercion and persuasion 
which leaves the permissibility of such behavior unclear.
247
  Harry would be thought to 
manipulate Sue if he made ―use of some part of [Sue‘s] motivational make-up in some set of 
circumstances with the view of getting [Sue] to do something [he] want[ed] [Sue] to do but [Sue] 
might not have wanted initially to do.‖248  While this may seem insidious, it is not necessarily so.  
It could be that A knows that B is a wealthy philanthropist and knows that if he/she approaches B 
about a need in the community, B will donate money, though perhaps B did not want or think to 
do it without the approach of A.  Archard even points out that one can manipulate another into 
doing something that will benefit the other, as for instance happens with parents and their 
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children.  Manipulation may not always be done in bad or dangerous ways, but one could claim 
that the agent is not being honest with the other in manipulating him/her, and thus is practicing 
deception, no matter how innocent or well-meaning.
249
  Yet, the difference between outright 
deception and manipulation seems to lie in the truth or falsity of the statements.  When agent A 
approaches agent B and discusses the need of the community in an attempt to gain his sympathy 
and generous donation, A is not lying or making a false statement, the community truly is in 
need, however, the intention of A is to get money, so it may seem deceptive.  Instead of A 
simply asking for a donation, A plays on the motivational make-up of B to get B to donate 
money.  Similarly, in the case of seduction, when A tells B that she is beautiful, A is not lying 
about it, but is merely telling B that she is beautiful in order to convince (manipulate) B into 
engaging in a sexual relationship.  So, B is being misled as to why A is telling her that she is 
beautiful, but A is not actually lying to B because A actually believes B to be beautiful.
250
  It is 
not clear that this is morally unacceptable.  A is telling the truth, and may have additional 
motivation in telling B something, but it does not seem to be required that B divulge this 
motivational intent.    Disclosing such information seems to go back to the earlier discussion of 
fraud in the inducement.  While perhaps B is being misled about the intentions or desire of A, the 
moral consequences are merely enough to make the situation perhaps less than ideal not morally 
impermissible.  It is not realistic or necessary for B to know everything about the situation, only 
those things that are relevant, and while the agent may be deceived in some way about the 
motivation behind the statement, the statement is not false.  However, most important in Kantian 
criticisms of manipulation is that B is not considering the actual wants of B.  A is merely after 
his/her own goals and ends.  The ends and goals of B are not taken into consideration; A is 
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merely using B as a means to an end and this, above all else, is what makes manipulation 
unacceptable morally for Kantians.    
 Exploitation is slightly different.  Oftentimes, manipulation and exploitation are thought 
to go hand-in-hand; however, there is a different component to exploitation that is typically 
viewed as worse than manipulation.  Exploitation is described by Archard as ―one party 
gain[ing] from his relationship to the other more than he otherwise would in some suitably 
specified baseline set of circumstances.‖251  In the initial scenario between Harry and Sue, Sue 
approached Harry, however, Harry is often viewed as the morally blameworthy agent and many 
may point to exploitation of Sue as the reason.  In sleeping with Sue, one may argue that Harry 
exploited Sue‘s adoration as a fan in order to gain something that he would not have gained 
otherwise.  In other words, Harry used his success to sleep with Sue.  If he were not successful, 
she perhaps would not have slept with him.  However, is it the case that Harry has really done 
something morally impermissible?  In such scenarios involving exploitation, A does not harm the 
interests of B (in the sense discussed by Feinberg in chapter one), and while Sue may be unhappy 
as a result of the interaction, hurt feelings, dissatisfaction, and regret are not reasons to morally 
condemn another.  Further, it does not seem as though it is necessarily wrong to exploit a certain 
situation.  For example, as Archard points out, certain people exploit ―extraordinary good looks, 
charm, intelligence, and sensitivity to the needs of others to win favors,‖ and in these cases and 
the case of Harry, these traits were not gotten immorally.
252
  It is simply a matter of using and 
exploiting strengths one has, which does not seem problematic unless actual harm is caused to 
the interests of others.  Simply because Sue is dissatisfied or unhappy with the situation also does 
not mean that Harry was morally blameworthy either.  As argued earlier, when consenting to an 
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act, one cannot know if one will enjoy it or gain anything from the encounter, and while it may 
be ideal for an agent to benefit or enjoy the consequences of an act, it is not always the case and 
cannot be immoral if these positive attributes are lacking in an interaction.  In many situations, 
not merely sexual, one is disappointed with the result of an act, a purchase, or a decision (to go to 
a party for instance), however, in these situations, it is not unfair, unjust, or wrong of the 
salesperson, party-thrower/friend, or sexual partner to get more out of the exchange.  The sexual 
activity between Harry and Sue, among other acts sexual and non-sexual, ―cannot be described 
as unfair,‖ according to Archard,  
since there seems no principle of justice which prescribes a fair distribution of 
sexual pleasures [or any other benefit /enjoyment] to the participants in a 
consensual activity. … It is not required that the giving be equally proportioned.  
We commend generosity and reciprocity in sexual partners, but we cannot be said 
to think that such generosity and reciprocity are obligatory.
253
   
 
When, in the case of Harry and Sue or a salesperson and customer, an agent knowingly consents 
to something and the outcome does not live up to the expectations, this does not mean the other 
is morally blameworthy, merely that the agent made a poor or bad choice (in the qualitative, not 
moral, sense).  However, certain types of exploitation that play upon an agent‘s 
psychological/mental problems (phobias for example), addictions, or extremely dire situation are 
morally problematic because, as discussed earlier, either the agent is no longer capable to 
consent (in the psychological/addiction cases) or as in the latter case is in a coercive situation.  
However, if A wants to go to a bar, and does not want to go alone, it is not morally 
impermissible if A uses the fact that B enjoys a particular band (which happens to be playing at a 
bar) to get B to go to a bar (which B would never normally do).  Again, though, the issue most 
Kantians take is that A is merely using B to forward A‘s own interests without consideration of 
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B‘s interests.  This is not always the case, as in the above example, A perhaps knows B would 
really like to see the band even though B despises bars and drinking.   
However, the problem with using a Kantian theory as the basis for consent theories lies in 
the fact that a person can still be seen as using another sexually after consent is obtained as can 
be seen in the cases of manipulation and exploitation (which the Kantian would simply argue are 
impermissible).  Harry received consent from Sue, and yet, many people still believe that Harry 
was morally wrong to ‗use‘ Sue.  ―He is careless with Sue in the sense that he does not care 
about her.  This,‖ according to Archard, ―is what is meant by ‗using‘ another, treating her as a 
means to one‘s own ends.‖254  Nevertheless, is it wrong in the cases of exploitation and 
manipulation or even persuasion to use another person?  If the answer is yes, then there is a 
problem with using Kantian ethics as a basis for consent theories without serious alteration or 
exceptions which many consent theorists would not grant.  Many consent theorists such as 
Bernard Baumrin, who claims that in consenting to sex, the two agents acquire new rights and 
duties that make it necessary to attempt an equal exchange, merely add additional criteria and 
conditions onto sexual interaction.  Archard claims that in the sense that there is no moral theory 
that justifies sexually using another Baumrin and other Kantian consent theorists are correct, 
however, from this there is no logical necessity to conclude that simply because it is not justified, 
it is morally impermissible or that there is an obligation (as Baumrin and other Kantians claim) 
―to treat the other sexually as an end.‖255  While it may be ideal to for two consenting adults to 
engage in sex that is reciprocal and mutually beneficial and enjoyable, it is not and should not be 
a requirement for morally permissible sex because it is a matter of ideals and what sex ‗ought‘ to 
be, not what sex is.  Simply because sex ought to be this way, does not mean that it is or if it is 
                                                 
254
Ibid, 78. 
255
 Ibid. 
111 
 
not, it is morally impermissible.  It merely falls short of the ideal, which, granted, could be bad 
for the individual who did not gain anything from the exchange, however, this does not make the 
other agent involved morally blameworthy, merely a poor sex partner.  Archard claims that 
we can characterize [such] sexual encounters … as casual, cheap, unloving, cold, 
empty, impoverished, shallow, and many other similar adjectives.  To say of such 
sex that it is ‗bad‘ for this reason is not to say that it is morally impermissible 
anymore than ‗bad‘ sex in the sense of unpleasant sex is proscribed.  Sex can be 
evaluated, and thus described as ‗bad,‘ in non-moral ways.256 
 
Ultimately, the idea that sex that does not live up to what Archard calls the ―mutual ends‖ ideal, 
is just that, not ideal.
257
  However, simply because something falls short of an ideal, does not 
make it morally impermissible.  So, while using another person may not be justified or ideal, it is 
not morally impermissible.  Those consent theories, such as Mappes‘ that rely on Kantian ethics 
here have a major problem because they claim that treating another as an end is acting with their 
consent, however, simply because one says yes to a sexual encounter, does not mean that their 
ends are taken into consideration.  Further, when one takes such a principle and extends it to 
other non-sexual situations, one would be hard-pressed to find many who would agree that it is 
wrong for customer A to use barista B at Starbucks, or homeowner A to use plumber B when the 
toilet is clogged, or even customer A to use hairdresser B when A wants a haircut.  While it 
could be argued that treating the other with respect and obtaining their consent is necessary to 
treating them as an end, it is unlikely that this is the only component necessary for treating 
another as an end, and is thus insufficient for a moral basis for consent.  Furthermore, Kantian 
principles are just as  consistently used in a theory such as Scruton‘s which demands an 
additional component to treat another as an end and thus fails to be sufficient for a sexual ethical 
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theory, which leaves the consent theorist still searching for justification for consent as a 
sufficient criterion for sexual ethics. 
Perhaps, then, the best way to look at consent theories is using a concept of autonomy 
that does not rely on many of the divisive and impersonal Kantian ideals.  When discussing 
autonomy, one can mean several things.  The most common understanding of autonomy is ‗self-
rule‘ or ‗self-governing‘ which is typically derived from Kant, however, it need not be.  Many of 
the ideas that Kant expressed in his work focus on an abstracted human dignity and do not 
support the choices of a person because it is that individual‘s choice, but rather, because of some 
abstract ‗humanity‘ that the individual possesses.258  This is not consistent with the idea of 
personal autonomy that is necessary in a consent theory.  There are several ways in which one 
can discuss autonomy and what it means to be autonomous.  The most relevant understanding of 
autonomy for the sake of this argument is borrowed heavily from Feinberg and Mill and is 
related to autonomy as a ‗right‘ which is, in a sense, roughly analogous with ―autonomous 
nation-states‖ which ―are said to have the sovereign right of self-determination.‖259   
However, as Feinberg notes, the two words, autonomy and sovereignty, are not always 
used synonymously in a political context, and are often used to make political distinctions 
between states which can be useful in understanding a meaning of personal autonomy.  The way 
these two concepts differ in politics amounts to the degree of freedom that is exercised and 
whether such freedom can be revoked.  For example, as Feinberg puts it, Great Britain is a 
sovereign nation made up of various parts.  The nation grants ‗local autonomy,‘ or freedom to 
self-govern to Wales, for instance; however, such autonomy can be revoked.  Thus, it is a 
privilege that is granted, not a right, for the states to govern themselves, whereas the nation of 
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Great Britain has a right to govern itself that is not revocable.  Consequently, in political 
language, ―sovereignty and (mere) political autonomy seem to differ in at least two respects.  
First, autonomy is partial and limited, while sovereignty is whole and undivided.‖260  Secondly, 
―a more important difference is that the authority of the sovereign state is a right whereas the 
authority of the autonomous region is a revocable privilege.‖261  So, as Feinberg states, when 
discussing autonomy of the self, one is not referring to political autonomy as would be analogous 
with Wales, but perhaps more clear and analogous to the philosophical meaning of self-
autonomy is self-sovereignty, as in the example of Great Britain.  Therefore, when discussing 
self-autonomy as a right, it is analogous to the sovereign state with a permanent right to govern 
itself, not a rescindable privilege that is granted by a higher authority.   The nation‘s/individual‘s 
rights of self-government are not typically seen as revocable.  However, here the similarity to 
political sovereignty extends to when those sovereign nations and people can have their rights to 
self-rule reversed, as in the case where a sovereign individual/state infringes on the 
sovereignty/rights of another of its kind.  When nations go to war, others often step in to 
prevent/aid in the fight for sovereignty.  Similarly, when an individual breaches the rights of 
another, the government has a right to step in and prevent the other‘s sovereignty from being 
threatened.   
However, where differences between nations and people may be evident, these 
differences, Feinberg argues, strengthen the argument for a personal sovereignty rather than 
weaken it.  Primarily when looking to the composition of states and individuals, a state is made 
up of autonomous individuals, whereas a person is made up of parts, i.e. desires, needs, ideas, 
body, these parts are not autonomous or sovereign.  The individual has absolute right over them.  
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So, while a nation may decide to exterminate a part of its population, which would be morally 
problematic, the analogous situation in an individual, i.e. removing a limb, would not have the 
same moral problems, because the body parts have no rights themselves.
262
       
To further the political analogy, Feinberg states that when talking about sovereignty, it is 
that thing that independent nations ―recognize‖ in another.  Similarly, in recognizing another as a 
person, one is recognizing their autonomy, sovereignty, or lack thereof.
263
  While there is a 
difference between autonomy and sovereignty in nations, there is also a difference between 
sovereignty and autonomy in people.  Those that lack mental competence or are under the age of 
adulthood may be considered autonomous, i.e. they have revocable privileges of self-rule granted 
by a sovereign person who is responsible for that autonomous individual, whereas fully 
competent adults are seen as sovereign and under the responsibility of none other.  When an 
individual is sovereign, the irrevocable right to act for and govern him/her self is seen as a part of 
what it means to be a person and this responsibility is recognized by others.  When, this right is 
not recognized, as in the case with those who lack the competence, then the rights of those 
people are protected for them.  And in the case with children, they are potential sovereign people 
and are developed in such a way that when they reach the age of adulthood, they are, in a sense, 
granted sovereignty and become fully responsible for their actions and choices.    Now, an 
autonomous/sovereign individual need not be a morally upstanding citizen, indeed as Feinberg 
states, one cannot  
rule out as impossible a selfish but autonomous person, a cold, mean, unloving 
but autonomous person, or a ruthless, or cruel autonomous person.  After all, a 
self-governing person is no less self-governed if he governs himself badly, no less 
authentic for having evil principles, no less autonomous if he uses his autonomy 
                                                 
262
 Ibid, 50. 
263
 Ibid, 48. 
115 
 
to commit aggression against another autonomous person.  The aggressor is 
morally deficient, but what he is deficient in is not necessarily autonomy.
264
 
 
However, whether or not a person is moral or not, does not affect the right he/she has to personal 
sovereignty.  The individual, whether morally bad or good, has a right to his/her sovereignty.  
However, when an individual violates the sovereignty of another, then he/she becomes morally 
responsible, and the violation of autonomy is what determines morally impermissible acts.   
But what exactly is it that the sovereign individual governs over?  In the analogy with the 
state, the state governs its territory, and is thus sovereign over its territory; similarly, the 
individual seems to be sovereign over his/her physical body because 
we do speak of an inviolate right which is infringed whenever another person 
inflicts a harmful or offensive contact on one‘s body without one‘s consent—an 
unwanted caress, a slap, a punch in the nose, a surgical operation, or even a 
threatening move that provokes the reasonable apprehension of such contacts.  
This must one part of what we mean by personal autonomy.
265
  
 
From this Feinberg states, ―to say that one‘s body is included in one‘s sovereign domain then, is 
to say more than that it cannot be treated in certain ways without one‘s consent.  It is to say that 
one‘s consent is both necessary and sufficient for its rightful treatment in those ways.‖266  The 
reason consent is necessary and sufficient for the authority of a sovereign individual is because 
such authority is a ―discretionary competence, an authority to choose and make decisions.‖267   
But it seems as though there is more to autonomy/sovereignty that just that of the body.  
After all, when Feinberg talks of offence and harm, are there not certain types of offence and 
harm that do not involve contact directly with the body?  For example, if A is sitting on her front 
porch and B exposes himself to her, and A is outraged and offended by this, it seems as though 
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A‘s rights have been violated even though B has not done anything to A‘s bodily sovereignty.  
Additionally, if A stole B‘s car, while not harming B‘s physical body, A is harming the interests 
of B by stealing B‘s property.  So, like the state, there are other things that the sovereign 
individual seems to rule over that are subject to dispute.  The state may argue over how far into 
the ocean its territory extends or how high up into the atmosphere, and similarly, the individual 
may argue that he/she rules over his/her ‗personal space.‘  As well as one‘s body, by the use of 
contracts and purchases, one is also understood as having sovereignty over his/her 
home/property and anything that is done with these possessions, must be with the permission of 
the owner.  Additionally, one also has sovereignty over his/her privacy because one has the right 
to ―determine by [one‘s] own choice what enters [one‘s] field of experience‖ because another 
can ―violate [one‘s] autonomy without actually touching [one‘s] body, by entering and 
remaining, uninvited, in [one‘s] personal space, or by transmitting into that space unwanted, 
spectacles, sounds, or odors.‖268   However, while one has this ‗right to privacy,‘ as Feinberg 
refers to it, in one‘s own home or among one‘s property, one does not have a legitimate claim to 
it when in the public domain, because if one does not like what one experiences in the public 
domain, one can always choose to return to one‘s home or choose another way to get to where 
one wishes to go.
269
  One cannot make a claim that his/her personal space has been violated in 
such circumstances because personal domain changes with changing circumstances.  When one 
is in one‘s house or property, one has control or rule over it; however, as Feinberg illustrates, 
once a person steps out into the public world, the amount of ‗personal space‘ that he/she has is 
lessened because the agent is leaving what is his/her own and emerging into that which is 
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collective.
270
  Simply because one does not like the experience one has in the public domain does 
not provide enough reason for the individual to alter it.  Only when such experience harms the 
interests or physical well-being of another is interference acceptable.  Thus, while the individual 
has limited personal space when entering the public domain, one‘s body and property also make 
up one‘s autonomous realm as long as it does not interfere with public safety and health the 
agent can choose to do as he she wishes.  Nevertheless, as Feinberg, correctly deduces, not only 
is control of the body, property, and privacy a part of one‘s autonomy, but also  
the right to make choices and decisions –what to put into my body, what contacts 
with my body to permit, where and how to move my body through public space, 
how to use my chattels and physical property, what personal information to 
disclose to others, what information to conceal, and more.  Some of these rights 
are more basic and more plausibly treated than others.  Put compendiously, the 
most basic autonomy-right is the right to decide how one is to live one‘s life, in 
particular, how to make the critical life-decisions.
271
     
 
However, it is important to determine what critical life-decisions are, and further, to determine if 
and when these decisions are legitimately limited.   
The offense and harm principles that were discussed in chapter one are the most 
significant principles that explicate when an individual is able to maintain his/her autonomy and 
when one is legitimately restrained from performing a certain act, what Feinberg refers to as 
‗personal domain boundaries.‘  This boundary is determined by whether an act is primarily self-
regarding or other-regarding.  A self-regarding act is an act that primarily affects the one acting, 
or only indirectly affects others.  Other-regarding acts are those that directly affect the interests 
of others as well as the self.  Primarily self-regarding actions that do not directly interfere with 
the interests of others are within the sovereign rights of the individual and cannot be infringed 
upon.  However, other-regarding acts are those acts which can be legitimately interfered with 
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because they interfere with the rights of others.  Now ‗others‘ are those third parties that are 
discussed in the principle of consentuality and can be thought to be any persons (either alive or 
dead).  However, while any and every person is considered to be a third party, they can only be 
said to be harmed if their interests are directly affected.
272
   
The breach of an individual‘s sovereignty determines whether an act is morally 
impermissible.  The most significant element that legitimately allows A‘s sovereign autonomy to 
be breached is when A performs an act without the permission of B that infringes upon B‘s 
sovereign realm.  However, when B consents to the act which would otherwise be seen as a 
breach of sovereignty, then the issue has changed completely.  If B validly consents to an act that 
would have violated his/her sovereignty if the consent was not present, then the act is no longer 
impermissible but rather morally permissible.  So, as this chapter has been discussing, when one 
individual gains the valid consent of another to enter upon his/her sovereignty, the act is no 
longer an infringement, but a morally acceptable act that does not violate the individual at all.  
Thus, the moral outcome of any other-regarding as well as self-regarding act depends upon 
obtaining valid consent because it is the right to choose for oneself to do something or not that 
expresses his/her right of personal sovereign autonomy and when one expresses this autonomy, 
there is no justifiable reason to have interference by another for any reason, and thus paternalism 
is rejected in any form.  The consent is both necessary (because without it, the act would be a 
violation of the individual‘s sovereignty and thus, morally impermissible) and sufficient (because 
it is the other individual‘s permission and authorization that transforms the actions from 
impermissible to permissible).  As a result, sovereignty can only be interfered with if another‘s 
autonomy is being compromised directly because of this situation.  The sovereignty of an agent 
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can no longer be interfered with when another agent grants consent and thus, the agents cannot 
be said to be performing a morally impermissible act.     
Prostitution and Consent 
Some critics of prostitution claim that many prostitutes are underage, poor, and/or 
addicted to drugs and this is bad.  These critics are correct.  It is not logical for critics to 
conclude, as they sometimes do, that consent theorists accept these forms of prostitution because 
they support consensual prostitution between informed, free adults.  Simply because one accepts 
consensual prostitution as morally permissible, does not mean that all forms of prostitution are 
permissible.  Prostitution is always impermissible in the above cases because in the scenario in 
which the agent is economically destitute, he/she truly has no choice but to comply and ‗consent‘ 
to sex because his/her life may be at stake in some way.  Similarly, sex in exchange for drugs in 
which the prostitute is addicted to drugs is also invalid because the influence of drugs affects 
both the capacity to consent and the voluntariness of the interaction.  The criticism that consent 
theorists accept underage prostitution as morally acceptable is unfounded.  As stated earlier, any 
case of underage sexual intercourse is impermissible on the ground that minors are incapable of 
consenting because they lack the mental maturity and such ‗consent‘ is invalid.  These situations 
are bad or morally impermissible.  But it is not the act of prostitution that is the issue in these 
cases; it is the lack of freedom to choose or autonomy and an inability to give valid consent to 
engage in prostitution.  The prostitute actually has no other choice when destitute and can be 
understood to be unable to consent or in the case of the drug addict or underage agent, have the 
capacity to consent to sex in such a situation.   
When looking at the example of prostitution, one really only needs to look to autonomy 
and consent to determine permissibility.  If the two agents in question are validly consenting 
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adults, whether male or female, straight or gay, in a loving relationship or engaging in 
promiscuous prostitution, and are not harming the interests of any third party, their act is morally 
permissible and respects the sovereignty and privacy of both parties.  So, let us examine the 
general character of prostitution.  In a sense, the exchange in prostitution is not merely 
promiscuous sexual interaction.  Prostitution is an exchange or offer that functions much as a 
contract.  There is an offer made (i.e. promise of payment or consent to perform x, where x is a 
specific sex act) in exchange for something else (i.e. consent to perform x or promise of 
payment).  So, recalling the previous discussion, there are both consent and promises involved in 
prostitution.  In prostitution, typically B approaches A and asks A to perform a certain sex act in 
exchange for money, or vice versa.  If A and B agree to the terms of the contract, then A 
conditionally consents to do x (i.e. consent to do implies obligation) with B on the assumption 
that B consents and promises (i.e. makes it obligatory) to pay x.  In prostitution it seems A 
consents to actively do x.  When A consents to do x, not only is A granting permission to B to 
engage in x, but is actively agreeing to do x, in which case, A consents to actively do a specific 
thing, thus resulting in a promise and an obligation on the part of the prostitute as well as the 
client.  Where B previously had a duty to refrain from sexual intercourse with A, he/she is now 
permitted to engage in the act because of the consent.  And it is because A agrees to do a specific 
thing that he/she is then under an obligation to B to actively do something.  However, B, by 
offering to pay A, is under an obligation to A if A does engage in sexual act x with B.  A‘s 
consent and promise were conditional, and since B agreed to the conditions, B is obligated to pay 
A the money, as in any contract.  Additionally, A is under an obligation to do x if B pays the 
money.  If A does not fulfill the terms (i.e. agreed upon (promised) sex act) then B is no longer 
under an obligation to pay.  In which case neither A nor B are worse off than before the offer 
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was made if one or the other refuses the terms.  If B refuses to pay after performing the agreed 
upon act, or if A refuses, once paid, to perform x, then the situation is morally problematic 
because the contract/agreement is broken and the autonomy of the individual is infringed upon.  
This moral problem arises because the prior consent given was conditional and the payment that 
was offered was also conditional.  When the terms are breached, the other‘s sovereign choice is 
violated and one party is worse off than before.  However, if the terms are not breached but 
rather fulfilled, then the situation of both parties can be said to have improved or each agent 
received that for which he/she bargained and their autonomy was respected.   
Prostitution is an offer that is not coercive in such a context.  It can become coercive or 
can be morally wrong, but it is not as such.  It is an offer of sex for money or an offer of money 
for sex.  There may be instances of a threat or coercion or a fear for one‘s life, in which case it is 
not voluntary and consent cannot be given.  But in the case of prostitution, one‘s life typically 
remains the same if one refuses the offer.  If one accepts the offer, it can be said that the life of 
the agent has improved; however, if an agent refuses, there are not morally negative 
consequences and if there are, the act is not acceptable.  Therefore, if the agent is competent to 
consent, free to choose, is informed of the relevant facts, and no other parties are significantly 
harmed, the act is morally permissible.  While prostitution, as an act between validly consenting 
adults who fulfill the terms of the contract, is primarily a self-regarding act between sovereign 
individuals exercising their right to choose for themselves, if this act infringes upon the 
sovereignty of another, say a spouse or a child, it is no longer morally permissible.  Or if the 
prostitute misleads the client in some way, the act is no longer permissible but only because the 
rights of the client were breached.   
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One could argue that as a business, prostitution, like any other business, should follow 
certain moral sales guidelines.  While not necessarily the primary scope of this paper, the ability 
to follow such guidelines could serve as justification for why prostitution should be considered 
no different than any other business interaction, after all, it is not the prostitute‘s body that is sold 
but rather an ability, skill, or service, similar in many senses to the barber (who does not sell his 
hands to the customer but rather the skillful use of them) or baseball player (who does not sell his 
body or self to the team but rather uses his body and skill to play for the team).  When critics 
apply a special significance to sexual interaction, that cannot and should not be upheld, and 
claim that the ‗self‘ of the prostitute cannot help but be harmed because of the intimate nature of 
the interaction, they trivialize the choice and autonomy of the prostitute.  Since prostitution is a 
primarily self-regarding action in which the other participant is a consenting adult, the autonomy 
is the only consideration to the permissibility, just as it is in gynecology or massage therapy, both 
also physically intimate occupations.  In which case, it is not the act of sexual ethics that is at 
issue, but business or sales ethics.  For that reason, the interaction should be governed by an 
ethics of sales such as that proposed by David Holley or Thomas Carson.
273
  The parameters for 
the ethics of sales, as laid out by both men in their articles on information disclosure in sales 
could easily apply to prostitution, and could perhaps serve as a basis for the proper interaction 
between client and prostitute as it does for sales associate and customer.  The criteria that Holley 
sets for the interaction of buyer and seller of goods is a voluntary exchange that consists of the 
following: 
1.   Both buyer and seller understand what they are giving up and what they are 
receiving in return. 
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2.  neither buyer nor seller is compelled to enter into the exchange as a result of 
coercion, severely restricted alternatives, or other constraints on the ability to 
choose. 
3.  Both buyer and seller are able at the time of the exchange to make rational 
judgments about its costs and benefits.
274
 
 
Additionally, there are certain practices that a seller cannot do to a customer, such as coerce, 
deceive, lie, withhold pertinent information, undermine the rationality or take advantage of the 
irrationality of the other party, or take advantage of the other party‘s lack of options,275 all of 
which pertain to any form of consensual interaction and thus also applies to prostitution.  Even 
Carson‘s slightly refined criteria for sales that ―salespeople have the prima facie duties do the 
following: 1.  Warn customers of potential hazards, 2.  Refrain from lying and deception, 3. 
Fully and honestly answer questions about what they are selling (insofar as their knowledge and 
time constraints permit), and 4.  Refrain from steering the customers toward purchases they have 
reason to think will be harmful to the customers.‖276  Whichever set of guidelines one chooses to 
hold as legitimate, they can easily apply to prostitution as a business.   
 While there are many sexual ethical theories that condemn prostitution as morally 
impermissible, they fail to stand up to scrutiny.  Consent theories based on a sense of respect for 
the right to individual autonomy on the other hand seem to be a more solid base to judge morally 
permissible acts and are able to encompass sexual ethics as well as non-sexual ethics in order to 
provide a normative basis to judge all actions performed by individuals.  When one performs an 
act and the act does not infringe on the rights and sovereignty of another, the act is morally 
permissible.  Furthermore, when one performs an act in a manner that would infringe on 
another‘s autonomy, but is granted consent by that person to perform the act, then the act is no 
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longer impermissible, but rather morally acceptable.  This accounts for all acts equally and does 
not include extraneous elements that the condemnatory theories rely upon in sexual ethics.  
Prostitution is a business transaction between validly consenting adults, and so long as it does not 
interfere with the interests of others, is a morally permissible act.   
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CONCLUSION 
While prostitution is illegal in the United States, there is a lively debate as to whether this 
is acceptable.  Prostitution is often viewed as morally impermissible, and therefore, wrong.  
However, as John Stuart Mill states in On Liberty, it is not clear that the government is or should 
be in the process of regulating morals based in paternalistic reasons.  Something should not be 
regulated for someone‘s ‗own good.‘  Acts that are primarily self-regarding that do not harm or 
affect the interests of others should never be regulated for someone‘s own good.  Things should 
only be regulated if they harm others.  Whether an act is moral or immoral is beside the point.  
So, laws against prostitution, which is primarily a self-regarding action, which affects others only 
with their consent, should not be illegal.   
 Further, it is not at all clear from this point that prostitution is in fact immoral.  Theories 
that condemn it as wrong and impermissible tend to call upon various ideas of impropriety and 
unnaturalness to show why it is immoral.  St. Thomas and socio-biologists claim that the only 
proper function of sex is for procreation, and thus prostitution is morally impermissible on this 
account.  Similarly, Roger Scruton claims that the only proper function of sex is to express love 
because of the interpersonal and intentionalizing nature of the act.  However, among other issues, 
the primary problem with these two theories is the failure to connect the morally improper with a 
failure to fulfill the function of sex.  The morally proper and the natural or proper function of sex 
are never shown to be the equivalent.  Additionally, it is not at all clear that there is only a single 
function for everything.  The radical feminist view that any heterosexual form of sex is immoral 
because of the power differential between men and women present in society makes it such that 
women can never properly consent to sex because women are always in a state of subjugation 
has many problems as well, not the least of which is univeralization of the position of women 
that does not account for individual experiences of women.  To claim that women as a group are 
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suppressed by men as a group is a common feminist claim that is accepted by many.  However, 
to claim as Pateman and other radical feminists that because of this every woman is therefore 
coerced or forced or subjugated by every man is simply untrue.  This fails to account for an 
interaction between a successful woman CEO and a poor man, or any woman in a place of power 
interacting with men.  To say as Pateman does that this does not matter that she is still a victim 
of subjugation, is simply unfounded.  To universalize such a general claim is a huge fault in such 
a theory.  These theories simply fail to provide adequate reason to suppose that an act such as 
prostitution is immoral.  The theories are weak in many senses because they insist that any act 
that does not fit within the parameters of the theory, which are already on shaky ground, is 
morally impermissible.  If the theories instead represented the ideal situation, there would be 
little problem with accepting one or the other as a personal preference attempting to live up to 
the ideal.  In which case, failing to live up to the ideal, which is less than good, is not immoral.  
So, not only should prostitution not be illegal whether it is moral or not, it does not even appear 
to be immoral. 
By looking at theories of consent that are based on a concept of autonomy, one is able to 
understand that prostitution, when performed under certain parameters, is morally permissible.  
The idea of personal autonomy or sovereignty is a part of what it means to be a human.  
Everyone has a sense of self and self rule that allows for one to act and make choices based on 
their own decisions.  When one acts is a way that does not infringe another‘s autonomy or 
significantly harm their interests, then they should be free to do so.  If one does want to act in a 
way that does affect the interests of others, they are permitted to do so only with the permission, 
authorization, or consent of the other.  This consent that is obtained must be valid.  In other 
words, it cannot be gotten through coercion or deception.  It must be gotten from a freely 
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(unforced), informed consenting adult who is competent to make such a decision.  If the agent is 
underage, under the influence of alcohol, or mentally deficient or disturbed, then the consent 
obtained is not valid.  Additionally, if the agent is forced or coerced in any way either physically 
or through lying and withholding relevant information, then the consent is invalid and the act is 
wrong.  However, if the consent is validly obtained, not only is the act allowable, but it is 
morally permissible.  Indeed, not only should prostitution not be illegal based on its moral 
impermissibility, it is not even morally impermissible to begin with.   
To conclude, prostitution, as such, is not coercive or immoral, so long as valid consent is 
obtained.  Indeed any sex act that occurs between freely, informed consenting adults is morally 
acceptable.  Prostitution is a combination of consenting sex and contractual exchange.  Any 
governing set of rules or morals that govern prostitution are based on this dual aspect of the act.  
If the act is between such validly consenting adults, who agree to the terms of the contract and 
fulfill the terms, there should be no moral issue with prostitution at all.   
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